ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347

ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347 text/xml public 2026-01-29T15:24:02 2026-01-28 Raad voor de Rechtspraak nl Rechtbank Den Haag 2026-01-28 C/09/659832 / HA ZA 24-53 (English translation) Uitspraak Eerste aanleg - meervoudig NL Den Haag Civiel recht; Verbintenissenrecht Rechtspraak.nl http://deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347 text/html public 2026-01-28T14:27:52 2026-01-28 Raad voor de Rechtspraak nl ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347 Rechtbank Den Haag , 28-01-2026 / C/09/659832 / HA ZA 24-53 (English translation) Climate case Bonaire. Public interest litigation. Human rights; Articles 2, 8, 14 ECHR. UN Climate Change Convention and Paris Agreement. Overall assessment according to ECtHR in KlimaSeniorinnen judgment; review of mitigation and adaptation measures and procedural safeguards. Declaratory judgment that the positive obligations of Article 8 of the ECHR have been violated. Unequal treatment. Declaratory judgment that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of the 12th Protocol to the ECHR. Order to the State to take measures in accordance with the UN agreements, including the preparation and implementation of an adaptation plan. Disclaimer: The translation of this judgment is solely intended to provide information. The Dutch text of the judgment is the only authentic and formal text (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1344). ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1348 - Papiamento translation The Hague District Court Commerce Team Case number: C/09/659832 / HA ZA 24-53 Judgment of 28 January 2026 in the case of GREENPEACE NETHERLANDS in Amsterdam, claimant, hereinafter: Greenpeace, attorneys-at-law: M.R.S. Bacon and E.W. Jurjens, versus THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS (Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), in The Hague, defendant, hereinafter: the State, attorneys-at-law: E.H.P. Brans and K. Winterink. 1 What is this case about? 1.1. This action initiated under the Settling of Large-scale Losses or Damage (Class Actions) Act concerns the questions of whether: the State has taken sufficient timely and appropriate measures to protect the inhabitants of Bonaire from the effects of climate change ( adaptation ), and whether the State’s climate policy complies with the equitable contribution it must make under the United Nations Climate Convention and the ensuing Paris Agreement. These stipulate that countries worldwide must take measures to limit global warming to less than 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of this century ( mitigation ). 1.2. Greenpeace is acting for the inhabitants of Bonaire in this case and believes that the State is not taking sufficient mitigation and adaptation measures to protect the inhabitants of Bonaire. According to Greenpeace, the State is therefore failing to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, the State offers the inhabitants of Bonaire less protection against climate change than the inhabitants of the European Netherlands and, according to Greenpeace, does not take sufficient account of the right of the inhabitants of Bonaire to experience and practise their own culture. According to Greenpeace, all this is unlawful towards the inhabitants of Bonaire. 1.3. The State believes that it is doing enough for the inhabitants of Bonaire in the areas of adaptation and mitigation. The State argues that it is not taking fewer measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire, but rather different measures that are specifically tailored to the situation in the Caribbean, which differs from that in the European Netherlands. In terms of mitigation, the State points out that it has considerable policy-making discretion and that the court cannot frame policy on its behalf; the State also points out that the Netherlands is already doing more than many other countries and cannot be held solely responsible for the global problem of climate change. 1.4. The court finds that the State has failed to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR towards the inhabitants of Bonaire, because the mitigation and adaptation measures as a whole taken by the competent authorities in relation to the inhabitants of Bonaire do not meet the obligations that the State has assumed in a UN context. The parties to the UN Climate Convention have deliberately designed a system in such a way that countries can be held individually responsible for a part of the global problem of climate change. The argument that the Netherlands and/or the EU is doing proportionally more than other countries is not decisive in this system, simply because countries are expected to contribute according to their ability and taking into account their historical emissions. The Netherlands and the EU both have considerable financial capacity and a significant share of historical emissions. 1.5. In addition, the State took mitigation and adaptation measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire much later and less systematically than for the inhabitants of the European Netherlands, even though it had been known since at least the early 1990s that: a. a) Bonaire would experience serious negative consequences of climate change earlier than the European Netherlands, and b) the local authorities on Bonaire did not have sufficient personnel, resources and specialist knowledge to counter those serious negative consequences. The State has failed to offer sufficient explanation why measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire were taken later and less systematically than for the inhabitants of the European Netherlands. It is clear that the circumstances on Bonaire are different from those in the European Netherlands and therefore require a customised approach; however, those circumstances point precisely to the need to take more mitigation and adaptation measures earlier. The court therefore finds that the State has also violated the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of the Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR. This too is unlawful towards the inhabitants of Bonaire. 1.6. Contrary to how Greenpeace has constructed its claims, the mitigation and adaptation measures cannot be assessed separately from each other; the assessment framework set out in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment consists of an overall assessment of all measures taken within a member state. Not every viewpoint that can be challenged in that overall assessment constitutes an individual violation of the ECHR and/or an unlawful act. The declaratory decisions that Greenpeace has sought are therefore only partially admissible. 1.7. The State has considerable policy-making discretion in choosing the measures it will take to fulfil the obligations it has assumed in the UN context. The court therefore orders the State to take effective measures to fulfil its UN obligations in a timely manner, but does not issue any orders as to how exactly the State should do so. That choice is reserved for the other powers within the trias politica. 1.8. Finally, the court notes that the parties to the ECHR have considerable freedom in making choices about their own constitutional structure. The downside of this freedom is that the parties cannot use difficulties arising from their chosen constitutional structure as a defence against citizens who complain about violations of their human rights. The court therefore assessed whether all the whole range of climate measures taken by the competent authorities vis-à-vis the inhabitants of Bonaire comply with the ECHR requirements; the State bears ultimate responsibility for this ‘overall picture’. This does not mean that only the State has failed in the internal relations between (the authorities of) Bonaire and the State – which are governed by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Dutch Constitution and the Public Bodies (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) Act.

Whether other levels of government have also failed to fulfil their obligations was not under consideration in these proceedings. 2 How is this judgment structured? 1. What is this case about? 1 2. How is this judgment structured? 3 3. The proceedings following the interim judgment on admissibility 4 4. Facts and background 5 a. Bonaire as a ‘small island’ 5 b. Consequences of climate change for Bonaire 8 c. Global developments in the field of climate 14 5. Relevant treaty law 17 a. UN treaty law 17 b. European legislation on climate change 27 c. Applicability of relevant treaty law on Bonaire 28 6. Relevant national climate law and policy 29 a. Climate law 30 b. Climate adaptation; European Netherlands 31 c. Climate adaptation; Bonaire 32 7. Political relations within the Kingdom 39 a. The run-up to 10-10-10 39 b. Kingdom affairs and national affairs 41 c. The BES islands in the political structure of the Netherlands 42 8. The claim and the defence 44 9. The assessment: general remarks about this case 47 10. The assessment: the assessment framework of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR 48 a. Articles 2 and 8 ECHR; general 49 b. Specifically in climate cases 50 11. The assessment: Greenpeace’s claims 58 a. Assessing mitigation and adaptation measures as a coherent whole 58 b. Assessment against Article 8 of the ECHR, not Article 2 of the ECHR 59 c. Overall assessment of all measures taken by the competent authorities 60 d. Mitigation measures 60 e. Adaptation measures 69 f. Procedural safeguards 76 g. Unequal treatment 78 h. Conclusion: violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR and Article 1 P12 81 i. Unlawful act 81 j. Allowability of claimed declaratory decisions 81 k. Allowability of claimed orders 82 l. Provisional enforceability 84 m. Costs of the proceedings 85 12. The decision 85 3 The proceedings following the interim judgment on admissibility 3.1. The following documents were added to the case file after the interim judgment of 25 September 2024: - the statement of defence of 9 October 2024 with exhibits 1 to 45, - the parties’ procedural proposal of 23 October 2024, - the court’s notice regarding the procedure of 24 October 2024, - the statement of reply and amendment of claim of 12 February 2025 with exhibits 80 to 110, - the rejoinder of 18 June 2025 with exhibits 46 to 70, - the deed of submission of exhibits 111 to 141, also deed of amendment of claim, received on 12 September 2025, - the notice on behalf of the State received on 17 September 2025, - the document containing exhibits 71 to 85 of the State, received on 19 September 2025, - the document containing exhibits 142 to 147 of Greenpeace, received on 29 September 2025, - the request from Greenpeace to deliver the judgment during a hearing and via livestream, received on 28 November 2025. 3.2. A hearing schedule was drawn up for the oral proceedings on both hearing days in consultation with the parties. The court also asked the parties a number of questions in advance, with the request that they answer these in their pleadings during the oral proceedings. 3.3. The oral proceedings took place on 7 and 8 October 2025 and were broadcast via livestream. The parties appeared, accompanied by their attorneys-at-law. The attorneys-at-law presented their arguments on the basis of written pleadings, which were added to the case file. Three residents of Bonaire made statements, which were also added to the case file. The parties answered questions from the court and were able to respond to each other. 3.4. The court drew up a report of what was discussed during the hearing. Due to the special nature of this case, the report will be sent to the parties at the same time as the judgment. 3.5. Finally, the date of delivery of this judgment was set. 4 Facts and background 4.1. From 1954 until 10 October 2010, Bonaire was part of the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles was a separate country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter: the Kingdom). Since 10 October 2010, Bonaire has been part of the country of the Netherlands. Bonaire is governed locally by the Public Body of Bonaire (hereinafter: the OLB). The OLB has an administrative structure similar to that of a municipality (see Chapter 7 for more details). a. Bonaire as a ‘small island’ 4.2. Bonaire is the largest and southernmost island of the Caribbean Netherlands. The island is located on the leeward side of the Caribbean at some 90 kilometres from the coast of Venezuela. Bonaire has a surface area of 288 km² and approximately 26,000 inhabitants. 4.3. The island is relatively flat and consists mainly of coral limestone. In the northwest, the island boasts a hillside landscape with the ‘Brandaris’ as its highest point (241 metres). The south of Bonaire is considerably lower. Here you will find the saliñas (salt lakes) in the southwest and the mangrove forests (Lac Bay) in the southeast. The capital, Kralendijk, is located on the west coast of the island. Two kilometres off the coast of Kralendijk lies the uninhabited coral island of Klein Bonaire. 4.4. Important pillars of Bonairean culture are fishing and agriculture on kunukus (farms); many cultural festivals are closely linked to these activities. Much of the important material cultural heritage is located in the low-lying areas. This includes the slave huts – the only tangible monuments from the slavery period – which are located near the coast. 4.5. Many inhabitants of Bonaire live in poverty due to low incomes and the high cost of living on the island. Bonaire’s economy is largely driven by tourism. Approximately 75% of tourists come to dive around the coral reefs. i. Vulnerability of small islands 4.6. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a United Nations (UN) organisation established in 1988 to provide governments with scientific information that can be used in developing climate policy. To this end, the IPCC periodically publishes Assessment Reports (AR). These reports, which are the result of collaboration between thousands of scientists from various disciplines around the world, reflect all the knowledge on climate that is currently available. The reports are produced after an extensive process involving multiple review rounds in which external experts and national governments can check everything and provide comments. 4.7. As early as 1990, in AR1, the IPCC mentioned in several places that and why ‘small islands’ are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. This is mainly due to their location, small size, and their high economic dependence on tourism and imports. Since 1995, starting with AR2, the IPCC has devoted a separate chapter in its Assessment Reports to small islands and their particular vulnerability to the effects of climate change. This vulnerability has also been noted by other bodies, specifically with regard to islands in the Caribbean. In 2022, the Secretary-General of the United Nations designated the Caribbean islands as the ‘ground zero’ of the global climate crisis. 4.8. In its latest report (AR6), the IPCC identified eight ‘ key risks ’ that negatively affect the liveability of small islands: loss of biodiversity and ecosystems in the sea and on the coast; flooding of coral islands; loss of biodiversity and ecosystems on land; uncertain access to water; destruction of homes and infrastructure; degradation of public health and well-being; economic decline and loss of livelihoods; loss of culture and heritage. 4.9. The IPCC studies also show that the negative effects of climate change and poverty reinforce each other. ii. Research for Bonaire 4.10. Scientific research into the effects of climate change on Bonaire specifically began several years ago, primarily with research by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (hereinafter: KNMI), which concluded in 2017 that Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (hereinafter collectively referred to as the BES islands) are highly vulnerable to climate change and that the coral reefs on Bonaire are threatened by sea level rise in combination with ocean acidification and warming. 4.11.

In the same year, scientists from Wageningen University & Research (hereinafter: WUR) observed that the effects of climate change on nature and biodiversity on the BES islands will be highly unfavourable. They specifically mention the loss of coastal habitats and coral bleaching. The research was commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs as part of the policy support research theme ‘Caribbean Netherlands’. 4.12. The Institute for Environmental Studies at VU Amsterdam (hereinafter: IVM) conducted research on behalf of Greenpeace into the consequences of climate change for Bonaire. The findings of this research were published in September 2022 in the report ‘The impacts of Climate Change on Bonaire’ . 4.13. The KNMI draws up annual climate scenarios for the European Netherlands. In the 2023 scenario, the KNMI also focused on the BES islands. b. Consequences of climate change for Bonaire 4.14. The KNMI developed four climate scenarios for Bonaire in KNMI’23: high emissions, dry (Hd), high emissions, wet (Hn), low emissions, dry (Ld) and low emissions, wet (Ln). In all these scenarios, the temperature and wind speed on Bonaire increase, while the annual amount of precipitation on Bonaire decreases to a greater or lesser extent or remains the same, depending on the scenario. The KNMI notes that sea level rise poses a particular threat to low-lying Bonaire. An overview of the findings is shown in the figure below: Figure 1: Climate change figures regarding sea level, temperature, precipitation and wind on Bonaire 4.15. Scientific research into the consequences of climate change for Bonaire has not yet yielded a complete picture of the impacts that climate change will have on the inhabitants. However, the parties do not dispute that Bonaire is already experiencing negative consequences of climate change and that these negative consequences will increase in the future. The sea level around Bonaire is rising, temperatures are increasing and there is a greater chance of longer, dry periods. The following sections identify several of the negative effects of climate change on Bonaire that are already occurring or are highly likely to occur in the near future. i. Temperature rise 4.16. In all four climate scenarios developed by the KNMI, the annual average temperature on Bonaire will increase in the coming century. In 2050, the annual average temperature is expected to be between 29.3 °C (low emissions scenario) and 29.8 °C (high emissions scenario). In 2100, the annual average temperature is expected to be between 29.2 °C (low emissions scenario) and 31.8 °C (high emissions scenario). ii. Sea level rise 4.17. In March 2022, the KNMI published a report on sea level rise around the BES islands. The report shows that the average sea level rise around the BES islands over the last three decades is comparable to the average global sea level rise during that period. The KNMI considers it likely that the sea level around the BES islands will rise slightly faster than the global average in the future. 4.18. KNMI’23 shows that sea levels around Bonaire are expected to rise by 14-34 cm (in the low emissions scenario) or 16-37 cm (in the high emissions scenario) by 2050. By 2100, sea levels will have risen by 31-78 cm (in the low emissions scenario) to 55-127 cm (in the high emissions scenario). That upper limit could rise to 3.4 metres if uncertain processes, such as the destabilisation of the Antarctic ice sheet, materialise before 2100. 4.19. The KNMI and the IVM mapped out the expected future sea level rise around Bonaire in 2022/2023 based on the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) developed by the IPCC. These SSPs can be divided into a low emissions scenario (SSP1-2.6), a moderate emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5) and a high emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5). The range of the potential sea level rise (in centimetres) around Bonaire is shown in the figure below: Figure 2: Estimated sea level rise relative to the period 1991-2020 (KNMI) and 1995-2014 (IVM) 4.20. The effect of the expected sea level rise is related to the altitude of Bonaire. Both the IVM and HKV Lijn in Water B.V., a company which was commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management in 2024 to further map flood risks due to climate change for the BES islands, (hereinafter: HKV) conclude that coastal flooding will occur in the southern part of Bonaire as a result of the expected average sea level rise. If no adaptation measures are taken, the saliñas in the south-west of the island and the mangroves in the south-east will become increasingly flooded, and parts of the southern and western coastline of Klein Bonaire in particular will shift further inland. HKV has mapped out the sea level rise on Bonaire in 2050 and 2100, for both the low and high emissions scenarios: Figure 3: Four flood maps of Bonaire for forecast years 2050 and 2100 (exclusively as a result of sea level rise) 4.21. According to HKV, there is no sea level rise in the regional risk profile for the current climate. According to the KNMI’23 scenarios, sea level rise will amount to 27 cm in 2050 and 85 cm in 2100. The resulting flooding will fall into the ‘limited’ impact category (< 5% affected) in 2050 and the ‘significant’ category (5-10% affected) in the forecast year 2100. 4.22. The IVM has mapped out the southern coastline of Bonaire in 2150 in the various emission scenarios: Figure 4: Future coastline of Bonaire in 2150 for three IPCC climate scenarios iii. Flooding due to tropical storms/hurricanes and extreme precipitation 4.23. The risk of flooding due to heavier storms and extreme precipitation on Bonaire is also increasing, partly due to climate change. In 2013, the OLB, in collaboration with the Haaglanden Safety Region, drew up a risk profile for Bonaire, which identifies flooding due to heavy rainfall and flooding due to tropical storms as risks. The report emphasises that such flooding could have a very serious impact on the island 4.24. In 2016, HKV conducted a quick scan to assess the water safety situation on the BES islands , looking at the risks and consequences of flooding from the sea and flooding as a result of extreme rainfall. HKV updated this quick scan in 2024 based on new knowledge and models, including the expected effects of climate change under various emissions scenarios. Regardless of the emissions scenario, HKV estimates the impact of flooding from the sea caused by a hurricane or tropical storm in the current climate and in the forecast year 2050 as ‘severe’ (10-25% affected) and in the forecast year 2100 as ‘very severe’ (25-50% affected). Flooding as a result of extreme precipitation that is ‘probable’ (a probability of ⅟2-⅟20 per year) or ‘highly probable’ (a probability of ⅟1-⅟2 per year (probability category) fall into the 'severe' impact class in both the current climate and in the 2050 and 2100 forecast years. The impact of both flooding due to extreme precipitation that is ‘possible’ (a probability of ⅟20-⅟200 per year) and extreme precipitation that is ‘improbable’ (a probability of ⅟200-⅟2000 per year) is ‘very severe’. iv. Consequences for public health 4.25. The parties agree that climate change has negative consequences for public health on Bonaire and that rising temperatures increase the risk of heat-related illnesses. The exact extent of the impact of climate change on health is difficult to predict. For Bonaire, little information is available about the possible development of climate-related health and disease risks on the island. However, the IVM has conducted research into the effects of climate change on public health on Bonaire. The IVM has concluded that climate change on Bonaire will highly probably elevate the risk of physical and mental disorders due to heat-related stress and food insecurity, and will lead to an increase in diseases transmitted by vectors (such as mosquitoes). Damage to infrastructure will also have a negative impact on the accessibility of healthcare. 4.26.

Research conducted by the international research project Global Commons Alliance shows that people thrive best at temperatures between 13 and 27 °C and that exposure to temperatures outside this so-called human climate niche has adverse effects on human health and well-being. The annual average temperature on Bonaire is currently 28.5 °C (see Figure 1 above), which is higher than the upper limit of the human climate niche. v. Consequences for nature 4.27. Recently, the WUR determined that nature on the BES islands is in moderate to very poor condition. In addition to invasive species and stray livestock, climate change is one of the most significant threats to the mangrove forests, the saliñas , the coral reef and other natural habitats on and around Bonaire. It is therefore also one of the most significant threats to biodiversity in the Caribbean Netherlands. vi. Consequences for culture 4.28. The IVM has conducted research into the consequences of climate change for cultural heritage on Bonaire. Much of Bonaire’s tangible heritage – including the slave and fisherman’s huts, the lighthouse and the salt pans – is located in the low-lying coastal areas in the south of Bonaire and is vulnerable to permanent inundation due to sea level rise, storms and extreme weather. The IVM has found that climate change also poses a threat to Bonaire’s intangible heritage, including traditional fishing and agriculture. 4.29. Until about 50 years ago, Bonaire was a virtually self-sufficient island where the inhabitants obtained their food from traditional fishing and small-scale, local agriculture and livestock farming. Currently, Bonaire is 99% dependent on imported food. Another factor is that the population of Bonaire has grown significantly over the past fifteen years. In addition, agriculture is becoming increasingly challenging due to the increasing drought on the island; there are also fewer fish, partly due to the warming and acidification of the seawater and the resulting damage to the coral. vii. Consequences for tourism and the economy 4.30. Many people on Bonaire live in poverty. People living in poverty are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change because they lack the resources to protect themselves against heat, extreme weather and flooding. In addition, climate change can lead to more poverty. The economy on Bonaire is heavily dependent on tourism; many tourists come to Bonaire to dive and see the coral reefs, and the mangrove forests are also popular among tourists. The preservation of the coral reefs and mangroves is therefore of great importance to the Bonairean economy. Climate change is one of the threats to the coral reef and mangroves, in addition to the process of siltation due to sediment deposits and the pressure of increased tourism. viii. Consequences for infrastructure 4.31. In addition, material damage is also expected to materialise due to climate change. Much of the key infrastructure and buildings are located on the coast and in the low-lying areas of Bonaire. Research by the IVM shows that Bonaire will be vulnerable to flooding due to sea level rise and storms in the future. The IVM has conducted research into the expected damage to infrastructure and buildings on Bonaire. This shows that even in the most positive climate scenarios, the expected damage to buildings on Bonaire in the future (2050 and 2150) will amount to millions of dollars. c. Global developments in the field of climate 4.32. In this case, it is not in dispute that man-made climate change poses real risks to humans worldwide and that the risks associated with climate change are already materialising in more and more places around the world. 4.33. In 2022, the global average temperature was already approximately 1.2 °C higher than in the pre-industrial era. This temperature increase is largely due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. 4.34. A large part of these emissions is the result of the combustion of fossil fuels, which releases the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2). Approximately half of these CO2 emissions will still be absorbed by forests, wetlands and oceans (known as ‘ carbon sinks ’) in the next thirty years. The rest of the CO₂ will remain in the atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years, acting as a type of heat-trapping blanket around the Earth. There are also other greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases. These gases have a (much) stronger warming effect than CO₂ and are not absorbed by the carbon sinks . The amount of these other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is also increasing and contributing to further global warming, although the warming effect of these gases lasts for a shorter period than that of CO₂. 4.35. A further rise in the average global temperature could have extremely harmful consequences worldwide. These include extreme heat, extreme drought, extreme precipitation, rising sea levels due to melting polar ice sheets and glaciers, warming oceans, floods and hurricanes. These harmful consequences are occurring with increasing frequency worldwide. The rise in the average global temperature poses a serious threat to ecosystems, food production systems and the people who depend on them. It is also clear that a sustained rise in temperature can lead to climate tipping points, which suddenly accelerate the process of climate change. When a tipping point is reached, the climate will change abruptly and dramatically in parts of the world. This may threaten the lives, health, well-being and living environment of many people – worldwide, and also in the Netherlands. 4.36. In recent years, scientists and politicians worldwide have jointly concluded that the negative consequences of climate change are even more extreme than previously thought. The adverse consequences for humans are shown in the figure below: Figure 5: The adverse impacts of human-caused climate change will continue to intensify 4.37. Originally, the UN member states (including the Netherlands) formulated the joint goal of limiting global temperature rise to ‘well below 2 °C and preferably to 1.5 °C’. Due to the increasing number of disasters caused by extreme weather conditions and based on further research results, the UN member states have decided that global warming must be limited to a maximum of 1.5 °C. It then became clear that the global average temperature had already risen by more than 1.2 °C of that 1.5 °C and that the temperature was rising at an ever-faster rate. Moreover, it has become apparent that countries have so far taken fewer measures than they previously promised, resulting in a backlog in reducing emissions (in other words, more needs to be done now in less time). 4.38. For all these reasons, the member states of the UN have agreed that greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced more significantly. In the following chapters, the court discusses the agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to which the Netherlands has committed itself, both internationally (Chapter 5) and nationally (Chapter 6). 5 Relevant treaty law a. UN treaty law i. UN Climate Convention 1992 5.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (hereinafter: the UN Climate Convention) of 1992 forms the basis for the UN agreements on reducing greenhouse gas emissions referred to below. The vast majority of the international community – 198 countries, including the Netherlands – has ratified this convention. 5.2. The aim of the UN Climate Convention is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the climate system. This level must also be achieved in time, i.e. within a timeframe that allows ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change. This will safeguard food production and ensure that economic development remains sustainable. 5.3. All member states of the UN Climate Convention are committed to protecting the climate system for the benefit of current and future generations.

It has been agreed that rich, developed countries will take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse effects, because they contributed more to greenhouse gas emissions in the past and, partly as a result, now have more resources at their disposal than less developed countries. These rich countries, including the Netherlands, are listed in Annex I to the UN Climate Convention; the court refers to this group of countries as ‘Annex I countries’ below. 5.4. The member states have agreed to take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or mitigate the causes of climate change and to limit the adverse effects of climate change. Climate policy and measures must take into account the various socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive and cover all economic sectors and (the adaptation of) all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. 5.5. Furthermore, member states should cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the effects of climate change. They must draw up and implement appropriate and integrated plans for the management of coastal areas, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and restoration of areas affected by drought, desertification or flooding. They must also take climate change into account in their policies and actions in the social, economic and environmental fields. Annex I countries must assist developing country member states, as they are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, by supporting their adaptation costs. 5.6. When formulating all their climate policies and taking climate measures, member states must use appropriate methods, for example by carrying out environmental impact assessments at national level. Member states are expected to promote scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and other research to remove the remaining uncertainties about the causes, consequences, extent and progression of climate change. 5.7. Although there is much uncertainty in climate change predictions – particularly regarding its progression, extent and regional patterns – the member states have agreed in the UN Climate Change Convention that they may not use these uncertainties as an argument for postponing action. 5.8. The ‘ Conference of the Parties ’ (hereinafter: COP) is the highest decision-making body within the UN Climate Convention. Almost every year, the COP organises a climate conference where member states take joint decisions and formulate new policies 5.9. The member states of the UN Climate Convention must draw up national inventories of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by source and removals by type of carbon sink . They must also use comparable calculation and administration methods agreed by the COP to ensure that the data are comparable. The inventories must be updated periodically, made public and made available to the COP. Member states must also draw up national programmes with measures to mitigate climate change, focusing on emissions by source and removals by type of carbon sink for all greenhouse gases, and must periodically review and update their own policies and practices. 5.10. Finally, member states have recognised the importance of involving citizens and civil society organisations in efforts to mitigate the negative effects of climate change. The member states have therefore agreed to ensure that the wider public has access to information on climate change and its effects, in order to enable broad participation in combating climate change and its impacts. ii. Kyoto Protocol 1997 5.11. During the third COP climate conference (COP3) in Kyoto, Japan, the member states of the UN Climate Convention reached agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. This protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005. Among other things, the protocol set new, more specific reduction targets for the period 2008-2012. For Annex I countries such as the Netherlands, the following requirements were established: “Article 3 Kyoto Protocol 1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. (…)” Cancún Adaptation Framework 2010 5.12. During COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, the member states noted that the effects of climate change were already becoming tangible worldwide in the form of changes in average temperature, shifts in seasons, an increasing frequency of extreme weather events and the start of ‘slow onset events’ . They concluded that the faster the climate changes and the longer adaptation efforts are delayed, the more difficult and expensive it will be to tackle climate change. The member states therefore decided to establish the Adaptation Committee . This committee oversees the implementation of the Cancún Adaptation Framework and provides knowledge and technical support to the member states. 5.13. In the Cancún Adaptation Framework , the member states paid particular attention to developing countries and ‘the particularly vulnerable people in the world’ , as they were already experiencing the negative effects of climate change at that time. iv. Paris Agreement 2016 5.14. On 22 April 2016, the twenty-first conference of the COP (COP21) led to the Paris Agreement. With this Agreement, the member states wanted to improve the goals and implementation of the UN Climate Convention, including by: keeping the rise in global average temperature well below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels and continuing to strive to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, as this would significantly reduce the risks and consequences of climate change; enhancing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and promoting resilience to climate change and low-carbon development in a manner that does not jeopardise food production; and aligning financial flows with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. These agreements must be implemented on the basis of equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities, taking into account different national circumstances. 5.15. All member states must in any case strive to ensure that the global greenhouse gas emissions is reached as soon as possible and that emissions are subsequently rapidly reduced in accordance with the best available scientific knowledge. In concrete terms, a balance between greenhouse gas emissions and capture/storage must be achieved in the second half of this century, i.e. from 2050 onwards. The guiding principles in all of this are equity, sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. 5.16. In order to achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement, all member states must make ambitious efforts and also publicly report on these efforts. The Agreement describes how efforts should be reported. 5.16.1. The Agreement gives member states considerable freedom in determining exactly what measures they want to take as part of their national efforts; however, these national efforts must show progress over time. Annex I countries must set absolute emission reduction targets for their entire economy. 5.16.2. In order to monitor progress on the national contributions, each member state must report every five years on the nationally determined contributions it intends to achieve. Member states must take national mitigation measures to achieve the targets of their national contributions. They must also keep track of these contributions, taking into account subsequent decisions of the COP and the results of interim reviews (‘ Global Stocktakes ’). 5.16.3. Each subsequent nationally determined contribution by a member state must reflect the highest possible level of ambition and go beyond the previous nationally determined contribution it has reported. 5.16.4.

All member states must formulate long-term strategies for low greenhouse gas emission-based development; they must also communicate these long-term strategies to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 5.16.5. Annex I countries must take the lead by setting absolute emission reduction targets for their entire economies. 5.16.6. Member states must also report on their nationally determined contributions. They must do so in a transparent, accurate, complete, comparable and consistent manner; double counting must be avoided. However, add-on mitigation benefits – for example, as a result of adaptation measures or economic diversification plans – may contribute to the mitigation results that the member states must track and report. 5.16.7. Furthermore, msmber States must provide the following information every five years : national inventory report on anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using methodologies accepted as good practice by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed by the COP; and the information necessary to monitor progress in the implementation and achievement of the member state’s nationally determined contribution. The information provided should be as clear and transparent as possible in order to facilitate its understanding. Member states agreed that this meant that communications should, where applicable, include quantifiable information on the reference point (including, where applicable, a base year), timeframes and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches, including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, where applicable, removals, and how the member state considers its nationally determined contribution to be equitable and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes to achieving the agreed temperature goal. 5.17. In the Paris Agreement, the member states also made further commitments on adaptation, based on the importance of preventing, minimising or addressing damage and loss caused by climate change. They recognised that adaptation has local and sub-national dimensions and that it is an essential component of the global long-term approach to climate change in order to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems. The member states committed to working together and taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 5.18. When taking adaptation measures, member states should follow a country-driven, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into account vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. Adaptation measures should be based on the best available scientific knowledge, indigenous peoples’ knowledge and local knowledge systems to ensure that adaptation is properly integrated into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and measures. 5.19. Member states may cooperate in implementing the Paris Agreement. They may do so by concluding an agreement and notifying the COP Secretariat of the provisions of that agreement. The agreement must specify the emission level allocated to each participating member state within the relevant period. Member states that are parties to such a cooperation agreement remain responsible for their own emission levels. 5.20. The member states of the European Union (EU) are parties to the Paris Agreement and have concluded a cooperation agreement. The EU is also an independent party to the Paris Agreement. v. Glasgow Climate Pact 5.21. In the climate conferences held since the Paris Agreement, the climate targets set out in the Paris Agreement have been repeatedly confirmed and even tightened. For example, at COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom, in 2020, the parties to the agreement confirmed in the Glasgow Climate Pact that the COP: “ I. Science and urgency 1. Recognizes the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking; (…) 3. Expresses alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1 °C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted; 4. Recalls Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances; 5. Stresses the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement; II. Adaptation 6. Notes with serious concern the findings from the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, including that climate and weather extremes and their adverse impacts on people and nature will continue to increase with every additional increment of rising temperatures; 7. Emphasizes the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity building and technology transfer, to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change in line with the best available science, taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties; (…) IV. Mitigation 20. Reaffirms the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels; 21. Recognizes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C; 22. Recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid century as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases; 23. Also recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty; 24. Welcomes efforts by Parties to communicate new or updated nationally determined contributions, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and other actions that demonstrate progress towards achievement of the Paris Agreement temperature goal; 25. Notes with serious concern the findings of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, according to which the aggregate greenhouse gas emission level, taking into account implementation of all submitted nationally determined contributions, is estimated to be 13.7 per cent above the 2010 level in 2030; 26. Emphasizes the urgent need for Parties to increase their efforts to collectively reduce emissions through accelerated action and implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement;” Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan 5.22. In late 2022, the COP confirmed the above in the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (COP27) . Among other things, the member states noted the following: “ I. Science and urgency (…) 6. Takes note of the 2022 adaptation gap and emissions gap reports of the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent global and regional reports of the World Meteorological Organization on the state of the climate; 7.

Reiterates that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and resolves to pursue further efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C; (…) IV. Mitigation 14. Recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions of 43 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2019 level; 15. Also recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of equity and the best available scientific knowledge, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty; (…) 17. Reiterates its invitation to Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane;” 5.23. The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan states the following on adaptation: “12. Also notes that the best available science, as well as traditional, indigenous and local knowledge, as appropriate, should be taken into account in addressing the priority gaps and needs referred to in paragraph 7 above and in enhancing the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans for developing countries; 13. Notes with serious concern the findings on adaptation gaps in the contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 14. Recognizes that long-term planning and accelerated implementation of adaptation actions, particularly in the next decade, is important for closing adaptation gaps; 15. Also recognizes that maladaptation can be avoided through flexible, multisectoral, inclusive and long-term planning and implementation of adaptation actions that benefit many sectors and systems; 16. Takes note of the support available to developing country Parties for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans and recognizes the importance of scaling up this support; 17. Encourages relevant organizations to continue coordinating support related to the process to formulate, update and implement national adaptation plans and to continue sharing lessons learned; 18. Notes that the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans is crucial to informing the assessment of progress towards achieving the global goal on adaptation, including through the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation and the global stocktake.” United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience 5.24. Following the outcomes of the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation , the member states (united in the COP) formulated global adaptation goals in 2023: 10. Decides that the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience includes the following targets in relation to the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle, recognizing the need to enhance adaptation action and support: (a) Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: by 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services; (b) Planning: by 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans; (c) Implementation: by 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to in paragraph 10(a) above; (d) Monitoring, evaluation and learning: by 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system; First Global Stocktake 5.25. The first interim evaluation ( First Global Stocktake ) was prepared for COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. To this end, the state of affairs in 2023 in the field of climate change and the effectiveness of the measures announced to combat it were examined. Key findings included that actual global emissions were not on track to meet the Paris Agreement targets and that not all of the plans submitted by member states had been implemented. As a result, more needs to be done than was anticipated to limit global warming to the agreed 1.5 °C, while there is less time to achieve this. The conclusion was that it is not only necessary to take ambitious (or more ambitious) measures, but also to actually implement the intended measures “13. Key finding 5: much more ambition in action and support is needed in implementing domestic mitigation measures and setting more ambitious targets in NDCs to realize existing and emerging opportunities across contexts, in order to reduce global GHG emissions by 43 per cent by 2030 and further by 60 per cent by 2035 compared with 2019 levels and reach net zero CO2 emissions by 2050 globally. ” viii. ‘Advisory Opinion’ of the International Court of Justice 5.26. On 29 March 2023, the UN General Assembly requested the highest UN court – the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – for an advisory opinion on the obligations of states with regard to climate change. On 23 July 2025, the ICJ published an advisory opinion setting out the mitigation and adaptation obligations on UN member states. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ explained a number of provisions of UN law that are also relevant to these proceedings and provided further context. The court takes this advisory opinion into account in its assessment of the claims in Chapter 8 below, where it concerns findings on specific rules and principles. However, the considerations cited below are relevant to the interpretation of all the rules mentioned above: “175. (…) the Court notes that not all provisions of a treaty readily lend themselves to classification as containing obligations of result or conduct, and each provision must be examined on its own terms in light of specific circumstances. The Court recalls that obligations of conduct in international environmental law entail an obligation to act with due diligence, requiring States parties “to use all the means at [their] disposal” with a view to fulfilling their international obligations”. (…) 208. It must be stressed that both types of obligations [ obligations of conduct and obligations of result, added by the court ] may result in the responsibility of a State for breach of the relevant obligation. While the issue of responsibility is addressed further under question (b) (see Part V below), the Court finds it useful here to note that, in the case of an obligation of conduct, a State acts wrongfully if it fails to use all means at its disposal to bring about the objective envisaged under the obligation, but will not act wrongfully if it takes all measures at its disposal with a view to fulfilling the obligation even if the desired objective is ultimately not achieved. In the case of an obligation of result, a State acts wrongfully if it fails to bring about the result required under the obligation. At the same time, it cannot be said that an obligation of result, such as an obligation to “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change”, will be met merely by the adoption of any policies and the taking of corresponding measures.