ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2026:1347

The Hague District Court Commerce Team Case number: C/09/659832 / HA ZA 24-53 Judgment of 28 January 2026 in the case of GREENPEACE NETHERLANDS in Amsterdam, claimant, hereinafter: Greenpeace, attorneys-at-law: M.R.S. Bacon and E.W. Jurjens, versus THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS (Ministry of Climate Policy and Green Growth, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), in The Hague, defendant, hereinafter: the State, attorneys-at-law: E.H.P. Brans and K. Winterink. 1 What is this case about? 1.1. This action initiated under the Settling of Large-scale Losses or Damage (Class Actions) Act concerns the questions of whether: the State has taken sufficient timely and appropriate measures to protect the inhabitants of Bonaire from the effects of climate change ( adaptation ), and whether the State’s climate policy complies with the equitable contribution it must make under the United Nations Climate Convention and the ensuing Paris Agreement. These stipulate that countries worldwide must take measures to limit global warming to less than 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of this century ( mitigation ). 1.2. Greenpeace is acting for the inhabitants of Bonaire in this case and believes that the State is not taking sufficient mitigation and adaptation measures to protect the inhabitants of Bonaire. According to Greenpeace, the State is therefore failing to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, the State offers the inhabitants of Bonaire less protection against climate change than the inhabitants of the European Netherlands and, according to Greenpeace, does not take sufficient account of the right of the inhabitants of Bonaire to experience and practise their own culture. According to Greenpeace, all this is unlawful towards the inhabitants of Bonaire. 1.3. The State believes that it is doing enough for the inhabitants of Bonaire in the areas of adaptation and mitigation. The State argues that it is not taking fewer measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire, but rather different measures that are specifically tailored to the situation in the Caribbean, which differs from that in the European Netherlands. In terms of mitigation, the State points out that it has considerable policy-making discretion and that the court cannot frame policy on its behalf; the State also points out that the Netherlands is already doing more than many other countries and cannot be held solely responsible for the global problem of climate change. 1.4. The court finds that the State has failed to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR towards the inhabitants of Bonaire, because the mitigation and adaptation measures as a whole taken by the competent authorities in relation to the inhabitants of Bonaire do not meet the obligations that the State has assumed in a UN context. The parties to the UN Climate Convention have deliberately designed a system in such a way that countries can be held individually responsible for a part of the global problem of climate change. The argument that the Netherlands and/or the EU is doing proportionally more than other countries is not decisive in this system, simply because countries are expected to contribute according to their ability and taking into account their historical emissions. The Netherlands and the EU both have considerable financial capacity and a significant share of historical emissions. 1.5. In addition, the State took mitigation and adaptation measures for the inhabitants of Bonaire much later and less systematically than for the inhabitants of the European Netherlands, even though it had been known since at least the early 1990s that: a. a) Bonaire would experience serious negative consequences of climate change earlier than the European Netherlands, and b) t Conclusion: violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR and Article 1 P12 81 i. Unlawful act 81 j. Allowability of claimed declaratory decisions 81 k. Allowability of claimed orders 82 l. Provisional enforceability 84 m. Costs of the proceedings 85 12. The decision 85 3 The proceedings following the interim judgment on admissibility 3.1. The following documents were added to the case file after the interim judgment of 25 September 2024:- the statement of defence of 9 October 2024 with exhibits 1 to 45, - the parties’ procedural proposal of 23 October 2024, - the court’s notice regarding the procedure of 24 October 2024, - the statement of reply and amendment of claim of 12 February 2025 with exhibits 80 to 110, - the rejoinder of 18 June 2025 with exhibits 46 to 70,- the deed of submission of exhibits 111 to 141, also deed of amendment of claim, received on 12 September 2025, - the notice on behalf of the State received on 17 September 2025, - the document containing exhibits 71 to 85 of the State, received on 19 September 2025, - the document containing exhibits 142 to 147 of Greenpeace, received on 29 September 2025, - the request from Greenpeace to deliver the judgment during a hearing and via livestream, received on 28 November 2025. 3.2. A hearing schedule was drawn up for the oral proceedings on both hearing days in consultation with the parties. The court also asked the parties a number of questions in advance, with the request that they answer these in their pleadings during the oral proceedings. 3.3. The oral proceedings took place on 7 and 8 October 2025 and were broadcast via livestream. The parties appeared, accompanied by their attorneys-at-law. The attorneys-at-law presented their arguments on the basis of written pleadings, which were added to the case file. Three residents of Bonaire made statements, which were also added to the case file. The parties answered questions from the court and were able to respond to each other. 3.4. The court drew up a report of what was discussed during the hearing. Due to the special nature of this case, the report will be sent to the parties at the same time as the judgment. 3.5. Finally, the date of delivery of this judgment was set. 4 Facts and background 4.1. From 1954 until 10 October 2010, Bonaire was part of the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles was a separate country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter: the Kingdom). Since 10 October 2010, Bonaire has been part of the country of the Netherlands. Bonaire is governed locally by the Public Body of Bonaire (hereinafter: the OLB). The OLB has an administrative structure similar to that of a municipality (see Chapter 7 for more details). a. Bonaire as a ‘small island’ 4.2. Bonaire is the largest and southernmost island of the Caribbean Netherlands. The island is located on the leeward side of the Caribbean at some 90 kilometres from the coast of Venezuela. Bonaire has a surface area of 288 km² and approximately 26,000 inhabitants. 4.3. The island is relatively flat and consists mainly of coral limestone. In the northwest, the island boasts a hillside landscape with the ‘Brandaris’ as its highest point (241 metres). The south of Bonaire is considerably lower. Here you will find the saliñas (salt lakes) in the southwest and the mangrove forests (Lac Bay) in the southeast. The capital, Kralendijk, is located on the west coast of the island. Two kilometres off the coast of Kralendijk lies the uninhabited coral island of Klein Bonaire. 4.4. Important pillars of Bonairean culture are fishing and agriculture on kunukus (farms); many cultural festivals are closely linked to these activities. Much of the important material cultural heritage is located in the low-lying areas. This includes the slave huts – the only tangible monuments from the slavery period – which are located near the coast. 4.5. Many inhabitants of Bonaire live in poverty due to low incomes and the high cost of living on the island. Bonaire’s econ Scientific research into the consequences of climate change for Bonaire has not yet yielded a complete picture of the impacts that climate change will have on the inhabitants. However, the parties do not dispute that Bonaire is already experiencing negative consequences of climate change and that these negative consequences will increase in the future. The sea level around Bonaire is rising, temperatures are increasing and there is a greater chance of longer, dry periods. The following sections identify several of the negative effects of climate change on Bonaire that are already occurring or are highly likely to occur in the near future. i. Temperature rise 4.16. In all four climate scenarios developed by the KNMI, the annual average temperature on Bonaire will increase in the coming century. In 2050, the annual average temperature is expected to be between 29.3 °C (low emissions scenario) and 29.8 °C (high emissions scenario). In 2100, the annual average temperature is expected to be between 29.2 °C (low emissions scenario) and 31.8 °C (high emissions scenario). ii. Sea level rise 4.17. In March 2022, the KNMI published a report on sea level rise around the BES islands. The report shows that the average sea level rise around the BES islands over the last three decades is comparable to the average global sea level rise during that period. The KNMI considers it likely that the sea level around the BES islands will rise slightly faster than the global average in the future. 4.18. KNMI’23 shows that sea levels around Bonaire are expected to rise by 14-34 cm (in the low emissions scenario) or 16-37 cm (in the high emissions scenario) by 2050. By 2100, sea levels will have risen by 31-78 cm (in the low emissions scenario) to 55-127 cm (in the high emissions scenario). That upper limit could rise to 3.4 metres if uncertain processes, such as the destabilisation of the Antarctic ice sheet, materialise before 2100. 4.19. The KNMI and the IVM mapped out the expected future sea level rise around Bonaire in 2022/2023 based on the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) developed by the IPCC. These SSPs can be divided into a low emissions scenario (SSP1-2.6), a moderate emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5) and a high emissions scenario (SSP5-8.5). The range of the potential sea level rise (in centimetres) around Bonaire is shown in the figure below: Figure 2: Estimated sea level rise relative to the period 1991-2020 (KNMI) and 1995-2014 (IVM) 4.20. The effect of the expected sea level rise is related to the altitude of Bonaire. Both the IVM and HKV Lijn in Water B.V., a company which was commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management in 2024 to further map flood risks due to climate change for the BES islands, (hereinafter: HKV) conclude that coastal flooding will occur in the southern part of Bonaire as a result of the expected average sea level rise. If no adaptation measures are taken, the saliñas in the south-west of the island and the mangroves in the south-east will become increasingly flooded, and parts of the southern and western coastline of Klein Bonaire in particular will shift further inland. HKV has mapped out the sea level rise on Bonaire in 2050 and 2100, for both the low and high emissions scenarios: Figure 3: Four flood maps of Bonaire for forecast years 2050 and 2100 (exclusively as a result of sea level rise) 4.21. According to HKV, there is no sea level rise in the regional risk profile for the current climate. According to the KNMI’23 scenarios, sea level rise will amount to 27 cm in 2050 and 85 cm in 2100. The resulting flooding will fall into the ‘limited’ impact category (< 5% affected) in 2050 and the ‘significant’ category (5-10% affected) in the forecast year 2100. 4.22. The IVM has mapped out the southern coastline of Bonaire in 2150 in the various emission scenarios: Figure 4: Future coastline of Bonaire in 2150 for three IPCC climate scenarios iii. Flooding due to tropical storms/hurricanes and Another factor is that the population of Bonaire has grown significantly over the past fifteen years. In addition, agriculture is becoming increasingly challenging due to the increasing drought on the island; there are also fewer fish, partly due to the warming and acidification of the seawater and the resulting damage to the coral. vii. Consequences for tourism and the economy 4.30. Many people on Bonaire live in poverty. People living in poverty are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change because they lack the resources to protect themselves against heat, extreme weather and flooding. In addition, climate change can lead to more poverty. The economy on Bonaire is heavily dependent on tourism; many tourists come to Bonaire to dive and see the coral reefs, and the mangrove forests are also popular among tourists. The preservation of the coral reefs and mangroves is therefore of great importance to the Bonairean economy. Climate change is one of the threats to the coral reef and mangroves, in addition to the process of siltation due to sediment deposits and the pressure of increased tourism. viii. Consequences for infrastructure 4.31. In addition, material damage is also expected to materialise due to climate change. Much of the key infrastructure and buildings are located on the coast and in the low-lying areas of Bonaire. Research by the IVM shows that Bonaire will be vulnerable to flooding due to sea level rise and storms in the future. The IVM has conducted research into the expected damage to infrastructure and buildings on Bonaire. This shows that even in the most positive climate scenarios, the expected damage to buildings on Bonaire in the future (2050 and 2150) will amount to millions of dollars. c. Global developments in the field of climate 4.32. In this case, it is not in dispute that man-made climate change poses real risks to humans worldwide and that the risks associated with climate change are already materialising in more and more places around the world. 4.33. In 2022, the global average temperature was already approximately 1.2 °C higher than in the pre-industrial era. This temperature increase is largely due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. 4.34. A large part of these emissions is the result of the combustion of fossil fuels, which releases the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2). Approximately half of these CO2 emissions will still be absorbed by forests, wetlands and oceans (known as ‘ carbon sinks ’) in the next thirty years. The rest of the CO₂ will remain in the atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years, acting as a type of heat-trapping blanket around the Earth. There are also other greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases. These gases have a (much) stronger warming effect than CO₂ and are not absorbed by the carbon sinks . The amount of these other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is also increasing and contributing to further global warming, although the warming effect of these gases lasts for a shorter period than that of CO₂. 4.35. A further rise in the average global temperature could have extremely harmful consequences worldwide. These include extreme heat, extreme drought, extreme precipitation, rising sea levels due to melting polar ice sheets and glaciers, warming oceans, floods and hurricanes. These harmful consequences are occurring with increasing frequency worldwide. The rise in the average global temperature poses a serious threat to ecosystems, food production systems and the people who depend on them. It is also clear that a sustained rise in temperature can lead to climate tipping points, which suddenly accelerate the process of climate change. When a tipping point is reached, the climate will change abruptly and dramatically in parts of the world. This may threaten the lives, health, well-being and living environment of many people – worldwide, and also in the Netherlands. 4.36. In recent years, scientists and politicians Member states are expected to promote scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and other research to remove the remaining uncertainties about the causes, consequences, extent and progression of climate change. 5.7. Although there is much uncertainty in climate change predictions – particularly regarding its progression, extent and regional patterns – the member states have agreed in the UN Climate Change Convention that they may not use these uncertainties as an argument for postponing action. 5.8. The ‘ Conference of the Parties ’ (hereinafter: COP) is the highest decision-making body within the UN Climate Convention. Almost every year, the COP organises a climate conference where member states take joint decisions and formulate new policies 5.9. The member states of the UN Climate Convention must draw up national inventories of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by source and removals by type of carbon sink . They must also use comparable calculation and administration methods agreed by the COP to ensure that the data are comparable. The inventories must be updated periodically, made public and made available to the COP. Member states must also draw up national programmes with measures to mitigate climate change, focusing on emissions by source and removals by type of carbon sink for all greenhouse gases, and must periodically review and update their own policies and practices. 5.10. Finally, member states have recognised the importance of involving citizens and civil society organisations in efforts to mitigate the negative effects of climate change. The member states have therefore agreed to ensure that the wider public has access to information on climate change and its effects, in order to enable broad participation in combating climate change and its impacts. ii. Kyoto Protocol 1997 5.11. During the third COP climate conference (COP3) in Kyoto, Japan, the member states of the UN Climate Convention reached agreement on the Kyoto Protocol. This protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005. Among other things, the protocol set new, more specific reduction targets for the period 2008-2012. For Annex I countries such as the Netherlands, the following requirements were established: “Article 3 Kyoto Protocol 1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. (…)” Cancún Adaptation Framework 2010 5.12. During COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, the member states noted that the effects of climate change were already becoming tangible worldwide in the form of changes in average temperature, shifts in seasons, an increasing frequency of extreme weather events and the start of ‘slow onset events’ . They concluded that the faster the climate changes and the longer adaptation efforts are delayed, the more difficult and expensive it will be to tackle climate change. The member states therefore decided to establish the Adaptation Committee . This committee oversees the implementation of the Cancún Adaptation Framework and provides knowledge and technical support to the member states. 5.13. In the Cancún Adaptation Framework , the member states paid particular attention to developing countries and ‘the particularly vulnerable people in the world’ , as they were already experiencing the negative effects of climate change at that time. iv. Paris Agreement 2016 5.14. On 22 April 2016, the twenty-first conference of the COP (COP21) led to the Paris Agreement. With this Agreement, the member states wanted to improve the goals and implementation of the UN Climate Convention Member states agreed that this meant that communications should, where applicable, include quantifiable information on the reference point (including, where applicable, a base year), timeframes and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches, including those for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and, where applicable, removals, and how the member state considers its nationally determined contribution to be equitable and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances, and how it contributes to achieving the agreed temperature goal. 5.17. In the Paris Agreement, the member states also made further commitments on adaptation, based on the importance of preventing, minimising or addressing damage and loss caused by climate change. They recognised that adaptation has local and sub-national dimensions and that it is an essential component of the global long-term approach to climate change in order to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems. The member states committed to working together and taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 5.18. When taking adaptation measures, member states should follow a country-driven, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into account vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. Adaptation measures should be based on the best available scientific knowledge, indigenous peoples’ knowledge and local knowledge systems to ensure that adaptation is properly integrated into relevant socio-economic and environmental policies and measures. 5.19. Member states may cooperate in implementing the Paris Agreement. They may do so by concluding an agreement and notifying the COP Secretariat of the provisions of that agreement. The agreement must specify the emission level allocated to each participating member state within the relevant period. Member states that are parties to such a cooperation agreement remain responsible for their own emission levels. 5.20. The member states of the European Union (EU) are parties to the Paris Agreement and have concluded a cooperation agreement. The EU is also an independent party to the Paris Agreement. v. Glasgow Climate Pact 5.21. In the climate conferences held since the Paris Agreement, the climate targets set out in the Paris Agreement have been repeatedly confirmed and even tightened. For example, at COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom, in 2020, the parties to the agreement confirmed in the Glasgow Climate Pact that the COP: “ I. Science and urgency 1. Recognizes the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking; (…) 3. Expresses alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1 °C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted; 4. Recalls Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, which provides that the Paris Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances; 5. Stresses the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement; II. Adaptation 6. Notes with serious concern the findings from the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, including that climate and weather extremes and their adverse impacts on people and nature will continue to increase with every additional increment of rising temperatures; 7. Emphasizes the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity building and t Notes with serious concern the findings on adaptation gaps in the contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 14. Recognizes that long-term planning and accelerated implementation of adaptation actions, particularly in the next decade, is important for closing adaptation gaps; 15. Also recognizes that maladaptation can be avoided through flexible, multisectoral, inclusive and long-term planning and implementation of adaptation actions that benefit many sectors and systems; 16. Takes note of the support available to developing country Parties for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans and recognizes the importance of scaling up this support; 17. Encourages relevant organizations to continue coordinating support related to the process to formulate, update and implement national adaptation plans and to continue sharing lessons learned; 18. Notes that the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans is crucial to informing the assessment of progress towards achieving the global goal on adaptation, including through the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation and the global stocktake.” United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience 5.24. Following the outcomes of the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation , the member states (united in the COP) formulated global adaptation goals in 2023: 10. Decides that the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience includes the following targets in relation to the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle, recognizing the need to enhance adaptation action and support: (a) Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: by 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services; (b) Planning: by 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans; (c) Implementation: by 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to in paragraph 10(a) above; (d) Monitoring, evaluation and learning: by 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system; First Global Stocktake 5.25. The first interim evaluation ( First Global Stocktake ) was prepared for COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. To this end, the state of affairs in 2023 in the field of climate change and the effectiveness of the measures announced to combat it were examined. Key findings included that actual global emissions were not on track to meet the Paris Agreement targets and that not all of the plans submitted by member states had been implemented. As a result, more needs to be done than was anticipated to limit global warming to the agreed 1.5 °C, while there is less time to achieve this. The conclusion was that it is not only necessary to take ambitious (or more ambitious) measures, but also to actually implement the intended measures “13. European climate legislation has its own governance structure, including administrative obligations that EU member states must comply with in order to track joint efforts and report to the UNFCCC. Among other things, member states must submit ‘integrated national energy and climate plans’ and long-term strategies, and update these every ten years. Member states must also submit progress reports every two years, including on the status of implementation of their own integrated national energy and climate plans and on forecasts. Estimated greenhouse gas inventories must be reported annually. The aim is that this coordinated system will lead to greater coherence and effectiveness of the measures taken within the EU. It would also significantly reduce complexity and administrative burdens for member states, EU institutions and other stakeholders. ii. European Climate Law 2021 5.30. The European Climate Law came into force on 30 June 2021, in the form of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119. This regulation contains two binding targets: one for climate neutrality in the EU by 2050 and one for a net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from the Union of at least 55% in 2030 relative to 1990. In doing so, the EU aims to meet the UN target of limiting global warming to 1.5 ⁰C and to make progress towards achieving the UN climate adaptation goals. iii. Fit for 55 package 5.31. In 2023, the EU adopted a series of legislative proposals revising all EU policy instruments necessary to achieve the 2030 climate target. With this so-called ‘Fit for 55’ package , the EU has reaffirmed that greenhouse gas emissions in the EU must be reduced by at least 55% by 2030 relative to 1990 levels, and that the EU must be climate neutral by 2050. The EU has set up a Just Transition Fund to support regions and sectors that are economically dependent on fossil fuels and that need to make major adjustments in the transition to a green economy. 5.32. Since the aforementioned First Global Stocktake , negotiations have been underway within the EU to set a new intermediate climate target for the EU for the year 2040. At the time of this judgment, no new target has yet been laid down in legislation. The proposal on which political agreement seems to have been reached is that CO2 emissions must be reduced by 90% in 2040 relative to 1990, with at most 5% of the reduction in emissions being achieved by purchasing international carbon credits . c. Applicability of relevant treaty law on Bonaire 5.33. Article 28 of the Charter stipulates that Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten may, if they so desire, become members of international organisations on the basis of international agreements entered into by the Kingdom. 5.34. The ECHR, the Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR and the ICCPR apply to the entire Kingdom, including Bonaire. 5.35. The Netherlands is a member of the UN Climate Convention and the Paris Agreement, but only in respect of the European part of the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum to the Approval of the Paris Agreement of 31 October 2016 states the following in this regard “4.2 The Caribbean part of the Netherlands The extension of the application of the Paris Agreement to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) requires the extension of the application of the Framework Agreement to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands; this is not yet the case.In the context of a possible acceptance of the Paris Agreement for the Caribbean part, consultations will be held with Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba on how they can make an (additional) contribution to achieving the general objective and long-term temperature goal of the Agreement. This could include increasing the islands’ adaptive capacity, strengthening their resilience to (the effects of) climate change, their mitigation plans, the necessary legislation and regulations, and the financing of the entire package. Once the preparation of the necessary implementing legislation has been com The KEV is a scientific report on the consequences of the climate policy pursued in the previous calendar year. It is a policy-neutral, factual representation of the state of climate policy, showing whether the climate targets can be achieved with the established and proposed climate policy. The KEV makes it clear whether additional measures are necessary to achieve the climate targets. The KEV is presented to parliament annually, at the same time as the Policy Document on Climate Change. Before the policy document is presented to parliament, the Advisory Division of the Council of State issues its advice. If the KEV and the policy document show that additional measures are needed to achieve the climate targets, a process is set in motion to prepare decision-making on additional measures. 6.6. In the KEV 2025 , the PBL has concluded that it is “ highly unlikely ”, with a probability of less than 5%, that the Netherlands will achieve the statutory climate target of a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030. 6.7. In its advice on the draft Climate and Energy Report 2025, the Advisory Division of the Council of State noted the following: “Based on the draft report and the KEV 2025, also viewed in relation to the estimates of previous years, the Division notes that, in broad terms, the Netherlands is making little progress towards achieving the 2030 targets when it comes to meeting its climate targets. This stagnation effectively means that there has been a regression, because greater steps will have to be taken in the future to still be able to achieve the climate targets.” b. Climate adaptation; European Netherlands 6.8. Since 1992 (the year in which the UN Climate Convention was concluded), the State has been engaged in implementing climate adaptation measures for the European Netherlands. Since then, the State has reported to the UNFCCC every four years on its mitigation and adaptation measures in a ‘ National Communication ’. 6.9. In its eighth National Communication to the UNFCCC , the State outlined the steps it took between 2006 and 2022 in the field of climate adaptation in the European Netherlands. These include the following actions: 2006 KNMI climate scenarios 2006 2006-2011 Spatial Adaptation to Climate Change Programme (ARK) 2007 National Adaptation Strategy Make Room for Climate 2008-2014 Research Programme Knowledge for Climate 2010-2014 Start of the Delta Programme (preparatory phase) from 2010 Presentation of annual update of the Delta Programme 2014 Start of implementation phase of the Delta Programme 2014 KNMI climate scenarios 2014 2016 National Climate Adaptation Strategy (NAS 2016) 2018 NAS Implementation programme 2018-2019 2021 KNMI Climate Alert 2022 Final report on evaluation of NAS 6.10. In 2012, the Netherlands Court of Audit determined that the climate adaptation policy for the European Netherlands at that time did not meet the requirements of the UN Climate Convention. For example, there was insufficient insight into the risks of climate change and the interrelationship between those risks, there was no integrated and effective adaptation policy, and the existing adaptation policy was not coordinated, monitored or evaluated. As a result, the European Netherlands would not be sufficiently prepared for the consequences of climate change. In response to this advice, the adaptation policy for the European Netherlands was further developed, implemented, evaluated and, following the evaluation, intensified. 6.11. Following the evaluation in 2022, the Cabinet adopted the National Climate Adaptation Implementation Programme (NUPKA) in 2023. Furthermore, in 2023, the KNMI adopted the climate scenarios discussed above. c. Climate adaptation; Bonaire 6.12. In this action, the State has divided the measures it is taking or supporting on Bonaire into four categories: strengthening basic facilities; preserving and strengthening the natural environment; security and crisis management; further steps towards an i The State has financed the construction of the monitoring system. 6.20. In early 2024, a new Spatial Development Programme for the Caribbean Netherlands (ROCN) was adopted within the framework of the NMBP, pursuant to Article 4 of the BES Spatial Development Planning (Principles) Act (Wgro Bes). The ROCN was drawn up in consultation with the executive councils of the public bodies and the Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning. The ROCN provides the OLB with frameworks for drawing up an island-specific spatial development plan focused on housing, climate change and the preservation of cultural and natural values. The State fulfils the role of partner to the OLB and takes responsibility for the realisation of good spatial developments. 6.21. The State is working on a system for licensing, supervision and enforcement (VTH system) to safeguard interests that aim to protect the laws on Bonaire in the field of nature and the environment. Improvement processes were initiated in response to a 2023 report by the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate, which found that it was unclear which companies were subject to licensing under the regulations in force at the time (the Nuisance Ordinance) and that there was no consistent system for supervision and enforcement. On 1 April 2024, the Establishments and Activities Decree (IAB BES) and underlying regulations came into force. This clarified the environmental rules for companies in the Caribbean Netherlands, improved the environmental impact assessment requirement and imposed an accountability obligation on the State Secretary for Infrastructure and Water Management for implementing VTH policy and VTH tasks. 6.22. Since 2017, the State has commissioned various studies relevant to climate change and climate adaptation on Bonaire, including studies on water safety, nature and the environment and climate. 6.23. On 27 September 2022, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science concluded a cultural covenant with the public bodies to promote cultural infrastructure in the Caribbean Netherlands. The cultural covenant focuses, among other things, on cultural education, the preservation and protection of tangible and intangible heritage, and (underwater) archaeology. A joint cultural agenda is drawn up for each island by the OLB and the Ministry; for Bonaire, this was done on 9 July 2024. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science plays a supporting role in this. iii. Security and crisis management 6.24. In 2023, the Ministry of Justice and Security drew up a Security Strategy for the Kingdom. This document identifies climate change as a threat with consequences that are “ increasingly serious and difficult to manage ”, including for the Caribbean Netherlands. The Security Strategy states, among other things, the following for the Caribbean Netherlands: “The ANV has methodically translated security interests into impact criteria, thereby providing insight into the extent to which these interests could be harmed. Together with domain-specific analyses,11 these analyses form an important input for the strategy and thus contribute to a strategic course on national security that not only focuses on short-term threats but also on (possible) developments in the threat in the longer term. [ endnote 11: Examples include the National Terrorist Threat Assessment, the State Actors Threat Assessment and the Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands , but also scientific studies on, for example, the impact of climate change on Bonaire. Where applicable, these analyses are referred to in the strategy.] (…) In the longer term, rising sea levels pose a significant threat: millions of people in cities in and around the Kingdom are becoming increasingly vulnerable to sea level rise. By 2050, two-thirds of the world’s population is expected to live in cities, with 800 million people in cities that are vulnerable to sea level rise. For Bonaire in particular, the effects of climate change mean that the islan In response to this advisory report, the State has taken the following steps: the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management has allocated a fixed annual budget to the KNMI to map out the consequences of climate change for the BES islands in relation to the climate scenarios; the KNMI’23 climate scenarios also focus on the Caribbean Netherlands; in 2023, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management commissioned Climate Adaptation Services to create the Climate Impact Atlas for the BES Islands with the aim of bringing together up-to-date knowledge about climate change in one place, enabling governments, residents and communities to view the effects of climate change in their specific region. This climate impact atlas has been available in three languages (Dutch, English and Papiamento) since 7 December 2023; - on 19 and 20 October 2023, workshops and public lectures were held on Bonaire to share developments in the field of climate information, discuss the KNMI’23 climate scenarios and introduce the Climate Impact Atlas for the BES Islands on Bonaire. The results of the workshops are included in the report ‘Climate Impacts for Bonaire’ ; - websites have been set up to inform the inhabitants of Bonaire about climate change, the importance of nature, and taking and preparing adaptation measures; in December 2023, satellite images of the BES islands were made available in the Dutch government’s satellite data portal. The images can be used for climate research and to analyse changes on Bonaire; in January 2024, flights were conducted around Bonaire to take aerial photographs and altitude measurements for inclusion in the Elevation Model of the Netherlands. The OLB and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations took the initiative for this project, and the Ministry also financed it. The new elevation model is now available; a virtual ‘vision tool’ has been launched that shows what Bonaire could look like in 2050 if a nature-inclusive vision is followed. 6.30. In 2023, a so-called Climate Table was set up on Bonaire with representatives from various sectors and governments, led by an independent chair. The Climate Table aims to develop a climate plan for Bonaire. The State commissioned consultancy firm Witteveen+Bos to draw up an overview of current and planned climate adaptation and mitigation efforts on the BES islands to support the drafting of the climate plan. The Witteveen+Bos report has been provided to the Climate Table project group. The State expects the climate plan to be ready in the first quarter of 2026. The structure of the Climate Table is shown in the figure below: Figure 6: Structure of Climate Table 6.31. The State is also committed to cooperation within the Kingdom and to international cooperation as follows: - strengthening Bonaire’s implementation capacity is a key priority within the Bonaire and Kingdom Administrative Agreement; the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, together with Dutch Water Authorities , is developing structural support for the Caribbean Netherlands in addressing challenges in the physical living environment; as of 1 July 2024, the VNG-Caribendesk has been established as part of a pilot project, co-financed by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The VNG-Caribendesk supports the BES islands with knowledge and expertise in strengthening policy, legislation and implementation. It is still unclear whether and, if so, how the VNG-Caribendesk will continue after the pilot project has ended; knowledge exchange within the Kingdom through conferences; - the BES islands are affiliated with the International Panel for Deltas and Coastal Areas (IPDC). On 21 May 2024, the IPDC published a report on how islands are dealing with climate change and how they can work together to be better prepared for the consequences of climate change; - in order to exploit more opportunities for financial support for the Caribbean Netherlands from international funds (inclu On 10 October 2010, the country of the Netherlands Antilles was dissolved and since then the Kingdom has consisted of four separate countries: Aruba, Curaçao, the Netherlands and Sint Maarten. Since that date, the BES islands have been part of the country of the Netherlands, as public bodies within the meaning of Article 134 of the Constitution. Since then, the political relations within the Kingdom have been as follows, as depicted in the figure below: Figure 7: Political relations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands b. Kingdom affairs and national affairs 7.7. Since 1954, the political relationship between the countries of the Kingdom has been governed by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter: the Charter). On 10 October 2010, the Charter was amended to reflect the new political relationships. 7.8. The Charter distinguishes between matters of legislation and administration that are handled by the Kingdom (Kingdom affairs) and matters that are handled by the countries themselves (national affairs). Article 3(1)(a) to (h) of the Charter lists a number of Kingdom affairs. Taking measures in relation to climate change is not included there. However, the second paragraph of this article stipulates – with reference to Article 55 of the Charter – that the countries may, by mutual agreement and by means of a Kingdom Act, declare other matters to be Kingdom affairs. 7.9. To date, the countries have not declared climate change (or measures relating to it) to be a Kingdom affair. This applies both to the period from 1954 to 10 October 2010 (when Bonaire was still part of the Netherlands Antilles) and to the period thereafter. Climate policy has therefore always been a national affair within the Kingdom. 7.10. The case file contains no information about policy or concrete measures relating to climate change that were taken on Bonaire in the period prior to 10 October 2010. 7.11. Article 43(1) of the Charter stipulates that each country shall ensure the realisation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, legal certainty and good governance. The second paragraph stipulates that guaranteeing these rights, freedoms, legal certainty and good governance is a Kingdom affair. The BES islands in the political structure of the Netherlands i. Constitutional arrangement for public bodies 7.12. Article 42 of the Charter stipulates that the constitutional structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is regulated by the Constitution. Caribbean public bodies are regulated in Chapter 7 of the Constitution. 7.13. The OLB was established by Article 2 of the Public Bodies (Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba) Act (hereinafter: WolBES). Chapter II of the WolBES regulates the structure and composition of the organs of the public body. 7.14. Public bodies have an administrative structure similar to that of a municipality. Pursuant to Article 5 WolBES, each public body has an island council (the equivalent of a municipal council), an executive council (the equivalent of a municipal executive) and a governor (the equivalent of a mayor). There is also an electoral college for the Senate. 7.15. The island of Bonaire thus has two levels of government: the OLB and the State. The State and the OLB have agreed that as many tasks as possible should be carried out at island level (the so-called ‘subsidiarity principle’). This agreement is in line with the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and is laid down in Chapter V of the WolBES, which regulates the relationship between the OLB and the Kingdom: Article 212 WolBES Our Minister promotes decentralisation for the benefit of the public bodies. Proposals for measures whereby certain affairs are considered to be national policy shall only be made if the subject of concern cannot be dealt with effectively and efficiently by the island administrations. 7.16. There is also a Kingdom Representative for the public bodies of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Article 187 WolBES). Th Greenpeace claims – in summary and after amendments to the claim – that the court should enter a judgment, provisionally enforceable as far as possible: In the context of adaptation measures: I. ruling that the State has acted and continues to act in violation of the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of Bonaire under Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and has thereby also acted and continues to act unlawfully by: failing to take (or at least insufficient) timely and appropriate measures to protect the inhabitants of Bonaire against the effects of climate change ( adaptation ); and/or exempting Bonaire, without legitimate purpose and without objective justification, from all (or at least virtually all) legislation, regulations and actual measures taken by the State in the context of protecting its inhabitants against the consequences of climate change ( adaptation ); failing to inform the inhabitants of Bonaire (or at least insufficiently) about the expected consequences of climate change and failing to involve them (or at least insufficiently) in the formulation of policy and the implementation of actual measures in the context of protecting the inhabitants of Bonaire against the consequences of climate change ( adaptation ); II. ordering the State to take all necessary measures in a timely manner to adequately protect Bonaire and its inhabitants against the consequences of climate change, including but not limited to: basing all its adaptation policy on Bonaire on, and testing it against, the applicable international human rights treaties ratified by the Netherlands, and providing clear reasons for doing so; establishing, as soon as reasonably possible and no later than 1 April 2027, or at least within a term determined by the court in the proper administration of justice, an adequate adaptation plan for Bonaire (or at least ensuring that such an adaptation plan is drawn up) in which all relevant scientific research, knowledge of the inhabitants of Bonaire and the wishes and needs of the inhabitants of Bonaire are clearly taken into account, and which clearly takes into account the structural challenges on Bonaire, such as poverty and the resilience of the inhabitants of Bonaire, and that has been assessed, at least in a transparent and reasoned manner, against the requirements that apply to timely and appropriate measures under Articles 2, 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the ICCPR; ensuring that the measures laid down in the adaptation plan will be implemented in a timely manner, including but not limited to making and continuing to make sufficient financial resources available for the implementation of the adaptation plan, and periodically evaluating the implementation of these measures and remedying any shortcomings in their implementation as soon as possible; immediately after the judgment in this case is delivered, initiating, or causing to be initiated, and maintaining the dissemination of information among the inhabitants of Bonaire about climate change and the consequences of climate change; immediately after the judgment in this case is delivered, initiating, or causing to be initiated, adequate scientific research into the historical, current and future consequences of climate change on Bonaire, and making sufficient resources available for this purpose, and continuing to enable such research; or at least to make such provisions deemed appropriate by the court. In the context of mitigation measures: III. ruling that the State has acted and continues to act in violation of the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of Bonaire under Articles 2, 8 and 14 ECHR and is therefore also acting unlawfully by to this day continuing to pursue a climate policy that does not meet what is clearly the minimum requirement for the State’s equitable contribution to the measures that must be taken worldwide to limit global warming at the end of The Urgenda Foundation submitted a claim for the State be ordered to limit greenhouse gas emissions in such a way that they would be reduced by 40% by the end of 2020 relative to 1990, and in any case by at least 25%. The district court awarded the claim in the sense that the State was ordered to reduce emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020 relative to 1990. The court of appeal upheld the court’s ruling in 2018, and in 2019 the Supreme Court upheld the order. The Supreme Court considered that it had been rightly ruled that the State was obliged under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR to achieve the 25% reduction target, due to the risk of dangerous climate change that could also seriously affect the right to life and well-being of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. 9.2. This case will also examine whether the State is fulfilling its obligation to protect its inhabitants – in this case specifically the inhabitants of Bonaire. Not only will the reduction targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050 be discussed, but also the measures taken by the State to protect them from the consequences of climate change. As in the case of Urgenda v. the State, an important question is whether the court can and is allowed to determine what the State must do. There is no dispute that measures (must) be taken; the question is whether the State is taking sufficient measures. The court can – and must, if so requested – give a ruling on this within the frameworks described below, whereby the court must exercise restraint and may not taken on the tasks of the legislator and the government. If there is a serious (imminent) violation of human rights, if it is sufficiently clear what needs to be done to avert that threat as much as possible and what can at least be expected of the State in that context, an order to that effect may be issued. 9.3. The State rightly argues that the Netherlands is not a major contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions and that the Netherlands and the European Union have, in fact, been taking the necessary steps to reduce emissions since the 1990s. Nor is it the case that if (only) the Netherlands achieves the reduction targets proposed in this case, this will make an immediate difference to further global warming and the situation of the inhabitants of Bonaire. In most cases, this defence would lead to a ruling that it is not sufficiently clear that the State can be blamed and/or is obliged to take measures. In this case, that would mean that the claims are dismissed. 9.4. However, climate cases are different because of the complexity of the climate problem and the undisputed seriousness of its consequences, which can affect everyone, including future generations. The Supreme Court already considered in 2019 that states have a shared responsibility in this regard and that, partly in view of the serious consequences of dangerous climate change, the defence that a state does not need to take responsibility because other countries are not fulfilling their shared responsibility cannot be accepted. Nor can the defence be accepted that a country’s own share of global greenhouse gas emissions is minor and that a reduction in emissions from its own territory makes little difference on a global scale. Acceptance of these defences would mean that a country could simply shirk its shared responsibility by pointing to other countries or to its small share in global emissions. 9.5. The ECHR confirmed this in 2024 : every state bears its own responsibility to take measures against climate change. That responsibility does not depend on what other states do or not do. Under treaty law, States are obliged to take measures against climate change and its consequences, even if the exact effect of those measures is not yet clear. The court therefore rejects the State’s arguments in this case, which boil down to the fact that it is not sufficiently clear what impact the further reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the Netherlands will have on cl Member states must regulate the licensing, establishment, operation, security and supervision of that activity and require all parties involved to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives or well-being could be endangered by the risks inherent in that activity. 10.6. The right to live and practise one’s own culture as referred to in Article 27 of the ICCPR is also protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. The court will therefore not assess Greenpeace’s claims separately against Article 27 of the ICCPR. b. Specifically in climate cases 10.7. In the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of 9 April 2024 , the Grand Chamber of the ECHR listed its own case law and focused on the problem of climate change. The ECHR had also taken account of the most recent developments at that time; this concerned not only the situation in the world and the state of the art of scientific knowledge on climate change, but also the state of international law. The judgment focuses on Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR and clarifies – for the first time – how Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR should be applied in climate cases from now on. As the Grand Chamber of the ECHR is the highest court for interpreting the ECHR, this court takes the legal framework set out in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment as its starting point. 10.8. In the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, the ECHR arrives at a special framework for climate cases because the assessment of complaints about violations of the ECHR related to climate change is so much more complex than the assessment in more traditional environmental cases. The ECHR explains this complexity in detail. 10.8.1. The ECHR had previously ruled on environmental cases, but those cases concerned situations involving specific sources of environmental damage. In such cases, it is possible to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty who is exposed to that specific damage and where. The existence of a causal link between an identifiable source of damage and the actual harmful effects on groups of people can generally also be clearly established in such ‘classic’ environmental cases. The same applies to the measures that have been taken – or not taken – to reduce the damage from that particular source. In short, in the classic environmental cases in which the ECHR had ruled up to that point, it was possible to establish a link between the alleged damage, the source of that damage and those who suffered damage, and it was clear what measures could have been taken to limit the damage from that source. 10.8.2. The situation is different in climate cases. There is no single clear source causing the damage; damage caused by climate change occurs because greenhouse gases from many different sources accumulate in the environment, where they then cause changes as an accumulated whole. Many of these sources do not, when viewed separately, emit quantities of greenhouse gases that are directly harmful to humans; the harmful effects arise from the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the environment and the complex chain of reactions that then takes place. The complexity of this chain of reactions makes it impossible to predict exactly where and when these reactions will take place, how intense they will be, and therefore who will be affected by them. 10.8.3. The accumulated total volume of greenhouse gases emitted worldwide causes global warming and climate change. This warming and climate change in turn lead to incidents or periods of extreme weather such as extreme heat waves, droughts, extreme rainfall, strong winds and storms, which in turn cause disasters such as forest fires, floods, landslides and avalanches. These consequences threaten human life and well-being and, in the longer term, even threaten to destroy the basis of food supplies and other livelihoods for people in the most severely affected areas. Entire populations around the world are already being affected, and even more people will be affected in the future; The ECtHR notes that the member states of the ECHR have also been aware of this serious threat for years and know that the risks will decrease if the global temperature rise is limited to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. The ECtHR further notes that there is broad consensus among scientists and politicians internationally that insufficient mitigation efforts are currently being made worldwide to achieve the goal of a maximum global temperature increase of 1.5 °C. This lack of action is causing greenhouse gas concentrations to rise, and with them the risks to humans. The need to take effective mitigation measures is therefore becoming increasingly urgent. 10.12. In recent years, the member states of the United Nations have repeatedly examined and confirmed the need for action, with an ever-increasing sense of urgency. The member states of the European Union have also done so at the EU level. 10.13. The member states of the ECHR have also repeatedly acknowledged in various forums that there is convincing scientific evidence that climate change has been contributing to an increase in morbidity and mortality rates for some time, especially among certain vulnerable groups, and that this increase has the potential to become irreversible and catastrophic due to a lack of effective action. 10.14. For all these reasons, the ECtHR takes as its starting point that there is a causal link relevant to the application of the ECHR between the causing or failure to tackle climate change by a member state and the consequences mentioned in Figure 5 (see 4.36) that individuals may experience as a result of climate change, and also that member states are aware of this. ii. Adjusted requirements apply in climate cases to assess or cause to assess human rights violations 10.15. It is established in the case law of the ECtHR in classic environmental cases that the positive obligations of a member state only come into play when a risk to the complainant exceeds a certain threshold. There must also be a causal link between that risk and the alleged failure of the member state to fulfil its positive obligations. In short, the complainant must demonstrate that and how his rights have been affected by specific actions or omissions on the part of a member state. 10.16. The ECtHR cites this classic case law in the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment and then considers that in climate cases, that threshold for (the victimisation of) a complainant and the content of a member state’s positive obligation cannot be determined on the basis of a strict causal (conditio sine qua non) link. If the classic causality requirements were to be upheld in climate cases, the complexity of the problem described above would mean that the rights of citizens enshrined in the ECHR could not be effectively guaranteed, despite the causes and severity of the dangers associated with climate change being recognised by the member states. 10.17. The ECtHR has found a solution in the way in which climate complaints can be submitted to the ECtHR: the threshold for individual victim status in climate cases is high (‘ especially high ’) , but in the context of climate cases, it allows collective complaints, which is not permitted in other cases. The logic behind this solution lies, among other things, in the fact that the consequences of climate change have already been studied internationally at the group level and are largely known. 10.18. This approach is in line with previous case law in which the ECtHR considered that where citizens in modern societies are confronted with particularly complex administrative decisions, the involvement of collective bodies is one of the most accessible means – and sometimes even the only means – available to them to effectively defend their interests. This is all the more true for climate change, as it is a global and complex phenomenon with multiple causes. Its adverse effects are not the concern of one specific individual or group of individuals, but constit provide evidence showing whether they have duly complied, or are in the process of complying, with the relevant targets; d. keep those targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and e. act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures. The international mitigation obligations to which the ECtHR refers here are those laid down in the UN Climate Convention and the resulting further agreements between the member states. When assessing whether there has been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR due to non-compliance with requirements a. to e., all requirements must be assessed in conjunction with each other. This assessment is of an overall nature; a failure on one specific point does not necessarily lead to a finding of a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 10.24.4. Where necessary, member states must supplement mitigation measures with adaptation measures aimed at alleviating the most serious or threatening consequences of climate change. Adaptation measures must be put in place and effectively applied in accordance with the best available evidence and consistent with the general rules for positive obligations of Member States referred to above under 10.5.2. 10.24.5. Due to the interconnection between adaptation and mitigation policies and the fact that some measures serve both mitigation and adaptation targets, the court will in fact have to make an overall assessment of all mitigation and adaptation measures as a whole taken by the member state. 10.24.6. Finally, when assessing whether the member state has remained within its margin of appreciation, it is also relevant that member states must observe two types of procedural safeguards when taking mitigation and adaptation measures: a. the relevant information, and in particular the conclusions of the relevant studies held by public authorities, must be made available to the public, and in particular to those persons who may be affected by the regulations and measures in question or the absence thereof; and b. procedures must be available through which the views of the public can be taken into account in the decision-making process. Obligation to furnish facts: the existence of a life-threatening danger/(a risk of) harm 10.25. As discussed above in 10.10 to 10.14, for the application of the ECHR, the courts assume in climate cases that there is a causal link between a member state causing or failing to tackle climate change and certain types of consequences that individuals are known to experience as a result of climate change. This means that complainants in climate cases do not have to argue or prove these elements in order to meet the threshold for the applicability of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. Nor do complainants have to prove that remedying the alleged violation offers a real prospect of limiting the alleged damage. 10.26. In the context of climate change, it is therefore up to the member state to argue (and, if necessary, prove) that there is no causal link between the conduct specifically complained of and the consequences known to affect individuals as a result of climate change. viii. High threshold for the application of Article 2 of the ECHR in collective climate cases 10.27. What this means exactly for assessing whether there has been a violation of Article 2 or 8 of the ECHR in a specific case is not clear from the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment. The ECtHR only explicitly assessed the complaints in that case against the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR, adding a few pointers for the assessment against Article 2 of the ECHR. The assessment under Article 2 of the ECHR is “to a large extent similar to” (but not identical to) the assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR. 10.28. In addition, it is not clear from the ECtHR’s considerations whether Article 2 of the ECHR can also be applied in collective actions. All things considered, the court understa For Article 2 of the ECHR to apply, the interest group will have to prove that there is an acute life-threatening situation, whereas for Article 8 of the ECHR to apply, it is sufficient that the life and well-being (or the enjoyment of other rights protected by Article 8 of the ECHR) of that group are at risk in the long term. 11 The assessment: Greenpeace’s claims a. Assessing mitigation and adaptation measures as a coherent whole 11.1. Greenpeace is seeking separate declaratory decisions with regard to the mitigation and adaptation measures taken by the State. However, it follows from the assessment framework for climate cases set out above that, in answering the question of whether the State has fulfilled its positive obligations, the court must assess the climate measures taken as a whole . Mitigation and adaptation measures cannot therefore be viewed separately in this context. b. Assessment against Article 8 of the ECHR, not Article 2 of the ECHR 11.2. The court will assess the mitigation and adaptation measures taken by the State and the associated procedural safeguards in the manner described above under 10.24 to 10.24.6. 11.3. The court will assess these measures against Article 8 of the ECHR and not against Article 2 of the ECHR. The court is of the opinion that Greenpeace has not sufficiently argued that the State’s failure to fulfil its positive obligations at the collective level could lead to the conclusion that there is an acute threat to the right to life of the inhabitants of Bonaire as referred to in Article 2 of the ECHR. This opinion is based on the following considerations. 11.3.1. The court considers it sufficiently plausible that climate change already poses an increased risk of illness and mortality for certain groups in the Caribbean region; the State has not disputed this either. 11.3.2. Both Article 2 and Article 8 of the ECHR offer citizens protection against dangers that threaten their lives. The difference between the provisions is that the protection afforded by Article 2 of the ECHR relates to acute threats to the lives of citizens, while other threats to their lives, life expectancy and/or health fall under the protection of Article 8 of the ECHR (see 10.28.2, 10.30 and 10.31). 11.3.3. Greenpeace argues that the inhabitants of Bonaire have been experiencing the increasing impact of climate change on their lives, well-being and living environment in various ways for many years. It also argues that the population of Bonaire is less able to protect itself than the population of the European Netherlands due to socio-economic circumstances. However, Greenpeace has not explained that and how the inhabitants of Bonaire are so intensely exposed to the harmful effects of climate change at a collective level that acute life-threatening situations arise. Although it is very serious that in twenty-five years’ time, significant parts of the island will most likely be inundated, this is not an acute life-threatening situation for ‘the inhabitants of Bonaire’ in general. The consequences for citizens will vary depending on where they live on the island, whether they are young or old, poor or rich, and whether they are healthy or have underlying medical conditions. The consequences (their nature, severity and extent) will also depend on the adaptation measures that will be taken in the coming years. The same applies in this collective action with regard to the rapidly rising annual average temperature, which at 28.5 °C is indeed already very high. 11.3.4. Greenpeace’s assertions – including those concerning the flooding of large parts of the island and the rapid rise in the average annual temperature – are sufficient to assume a possible violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. These arguments have not been contested by the State and the situations described pose – to varying degrees – a threat to the life, health, well-being and/or quality of life of the inhabitants of Bonaire. The court will therefore assess Gree The EU ETS1, EU ETS2, the ESR Regulation and the LULUCF Regulation quantify the emission allowance for the EU until 2030; for the quantification of the emission allowance up to and including 2050, the State refers to the indicative greenhouse gas budget drawn up by the European Commission on the basis of Article 4 of the EU Climate Law, which was published at the same time as the opinion of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change in February 2024. ii. Summary of the legal framework for mitigation 11.7. In summary (see also 10.24.3), in order to fulfil its positive obligation under Article 8 of the ECHR, the State must: adopt general measures specifying a target timeline for achieving carbon neutrality in line with the overarching goal for national and/or global climate-change mitigation commitments (namely the UN Climate Convention and the further agreements between Member States based on the Convention); set out binding intermediate GHG emissions reduction targets and pathways that are deemed capable, in principle, of meeting the overall national GHG reduction goals within the relevant time frames, for the entire period up to net zero emissions; provide evidence showing whether it has duly complied, or is in the process of complying, with the relevant targets; keep those targets updated with due diligence, and based on the best available evidence; and act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner when devising and implementing the relevant legislation and measures. 11.8. Although the UN Climate Convention and the agreements based on it do not directly apply to the BES islands, these regulations do reflect the international consensus on the obligations that states have towards their citizens in the context of climate change. That is why the court is also assessing Greenpeace’s claims against these regulations. 11.9. The UN Climate Convention and the agreements based on it contain the following obligations relevant to these proceedings for Annex I countries such as the Netherlands: 11.9.1. Member states must be climate neutral by the second half of this century. 11.9.2. Member states should aim to limit global temperature rise to a maximum of 1.5 °C. In 2022, member states believed that this would require a 45% reduction in global CO₂ emissions by 2030 relative to 2010 levels and net zero emissions by the middle of the century, as well as ‘deep reductions in other greenhouse gases’. In 2023, the interim target for 2030 was revised to a 43% reduction in emissions of all greenhouse gases relative to 2019 levels. 11.9.3. The IPCC’s ‘ First Global Stocktake ’ showed that member states were lagging behind in implementing their commitments to date, meaning that they would have to make additional efforts to catch up. This means that all member states must adjust their nationally determined contributions to the further agreements arising from the Glasgow Climate Pact and the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan , and the results of interim evaluations. Annex I countries such as the Netherlands must also take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, given their past and their socio-economic advantage (partly acquired due to their past). 11.9.4. The current state of affairs is therefore that Annex I countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 43% by 2030 relative to 2019 levels and to net zero by around 2050. These targets represent the lower limit of the commitments for Annex I countries, as they had to step up their efforts when it became clear from the First Global Stocktake that their efforts at that time were insufficient to keep the target of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C within reach. 11.10. Furthermore, the UN Climate Convention and the further agreements based on it contain a number of specific administrative, communication and publication obligations. 11.10.1. Particularly relevant to this case is the obligation to compile a national inventory of anthropogenic emiss Secondly, the target for 2030 in the Dutch Climate Act does not correspond to the target set out in the Glasgow Climate Pact and the Sharm-El-Sheikh Implementation Plan . The Dutch Climate Act – like the European Climate Law – is based on a 55% reduction in emissions in 2030 relative to 1990 levels, rather than compared to 2019 levels as required by current UN standards. 11.13.3. Although the Dutch and European targets appear similar to the UN standard at first glance, they are actually based on different parameters, including different reference years and different emission sources included in the calculations. For example, the UN standard also includes emissions from aviation and shipping. Although it is known that emissions from these sources are significant in the Netherlands due to the presence of internationally important hubs such as Schiphol Airport and the Port of Rotterdam, emissions from these sources are not included, or not fully included, in the Dutch targets. The European targets only partially include emissions from these sources. This is at odds with Article 3(3) of the UN Climate Convention, which stipulates that climate policy and measures must cover all economic sectors and (the adaptation of) all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. Such differences also complicate monitoring by civil society organisations and the courts, which is at odds with the obligation to ensure maximum transparency in all reports submitted to the COP and the obligation to inform the citizens concerned about the climate policy pursued. The foregoing is a strong indication that both the Dutch and European reduction standards are indeed – as Greenpeace claims – lower than the UN minimum standards for Annex I countries. On the basis of what the State has argued in this case, it cannot be established that this is not the case. 11.13.4. Contrary to what the structure of Greenpeace’s claims seems to assume, not every shortcoming in a national climate policy constitutes a violation of the positive obligations on the State under Article 8 of the ECHR. Greenpeace rightly points out that Annex I countries such as the Netherlands have committed themselves to making greater efforts overall than the minimum required of average and less developed member states. However, Greenpeace fails to recognise that the State can also make these additional efforts in ways other than by reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions more quickly or by more than the agreed minimum percentage. For example, the State may choose to provide additional support to other countries in reducing their emissions or in taking adaptation measures. In any case, UN member states have a considerable margin of appreciation in choosing the additional efforts they must make. This choice is influenced not only by past emissions, but also by the resources available to a member state and the other circumstances in which the member state finds itself at that time. The court will exercise restraint in this regard. The fact that the State does not reduce its own greenhouse gas emissions more quickly and/or by more than the percentage agreed within the UN context does not in itself constitute a breach of its positive obligations. 11.13.5. However, contrary to what the State appears to take as a starting point in its defence, it may well carry weight in the overall assessment in the context of Article 8 of the ECHR if, in exercising its margin of appreciation, it opts to a significant extent and/or on important points for principles or methods that, although not prohibited, are nevertheless controversial internationally. An example of this is grandfathering : developed countries taking too little account of their own past emissions, for example by appropriating a disproportionately large share of the remaining global emissions budget. This point is relevant in this case because the State acknowledges that grandfathering is a controversial method and because the Ministry The policy instruments mentioned by the State do not provide for reduction plans and measures for the period after 2030; nor do they quantify Dutch emissions for the period between 2030 and 2050. This is at odds with the State’s obligations under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement (including paragraphs 4, 8 and 19). During the oral proceedings, the State stated that political agreement on such policy instruments had been reached very recently, but no information on this was presented to the court. The court therefore also considers this point to be negative, on the understanding that its judgment does not relate to any new policy instruments. 11.15.6. In this context, it is also relevant that in September 2023, the Ministry of Finance concluded that the Netherlands’ remaining carbon budget would already be exceeded in the next two years. This fact casts a negative light on the lack of a clear quantification of the Netherlands’ remaining emissions budget. 11.16. As an aside, the court notes that if the EU’s contribution does not meet UN standards – which appears to be the case on at least two important points – the Netherlands must submit its own NDC in accordance with Article 4(16) to (18) of the Paris Agreement. iv. Interim conclusion on mitigation measures 11.17. The court finds that, in the past, Dutch legislation in the field of mitigation failed to meet the minimum standards agreed within the UN context on important points, and that current legislation also fails to meet these standards on important points. Adaptation measures i. Arguments of the parties 11.18. According to Greenpeace, vis-à-vis the inhabitants of Bonaire the State is not complying with the standard of due care that states must observe when taking adaptation measures. In summary, Greenpeace substantiates this as follows. 11.18.1. Greenpeace refers to the research studies mentioned in Chapter 4, which show that the inhabitants of Bonaire have been suffering increasing damage from climate change for many years, ranging from an increased risk of mortality, heat stress and other health problems; damage to agriculture due to persistent drought; damage to infrastructure due to drought, flooding and other forms of extreme weather. 11.18.2. The research also shows that a large part of Bonaire will be inundated in twenty-five years’ time, and studies by UNICEF and others show that this prospect is causing great concern among the island’s inhabitants. Greenpeace calls for special attention to the younger generation of Bonaireans, who have to live with the uncertainty of whether – and if so, how – they will be able to shape their future on the island. 11.18.3. According to Greenpeace, it follows from Article 4 of the UN Climate Convention, Article 7(9) of the Paris Agreement, the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment of the ECtHR, the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ and the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IAHRM) that there is international consensus that the State has an obligation to take timely action to: conduct thorough research into climate risks, or have such research conducted, and this research must form the basis for the national adaptation plan; the research must pay particular attention to ‘ vulnerable people, places and ecosystems ’; draw up a national adaptation plan with a clear adaptation objective; ensure the effective implementation of that adaptation plan, including by providing sufficient technical and financial resources; pursue an integrated adaptation policy that effectively takes into account all the risks associated with climate change and effectively helps to build resilience; provide a system for monitoring and evaluating the adaptation policy; always integrate a human rights perspective, including the principle of non-discrimination, into (the implementation of) climate policy. According to Greenpeace, the State has failed to meet these requirements for Bonaire. 11.18.4. According to Greenpeace, the State has failed to do all this for At present, there is no legislation or regulation in the European Netherlands that makes climate adaptation policy mandatory for local authorities. 11.19.6. The State is aware that it has a duty to ensure the fundamental human rights of the inhabitants of Bonaire are realised, including protection against the effects of climate change. The State points out that it is doing so. At the national level, it is working on a national climate adaptation strategy (the NAS 2026), which includes the Caribbean Netherlands. At the local level, a climate plan for Bonaire is being developed. Although this is an autonomous task of the OLB, the State supports the OLB with financial resources (including by funding climate research and the Bonaire Climate Table project group), knowledge exchange and implementation capacity. The Bonaire Climate Table project group is also already working on preparing an integrated climate plan for Bonaire. 11.19.7. The State recognises that Bonaire’s culture is expected to be affected by climate change, but according to the State, those effects are not yet apparent. The alleged effects on agriculture, fishing and cultural festivals on Bonaire are difficult to measure, according to the State. According to the State, Greenpeace has not proven that there is already an actual impact on the right to culture on Bonaire. Moreover, numerous measures are being taken to protect Bonaire’s cultural heritage. The State refers to the Cultural Covenant, which has been elaborated in a cultural agenda and the BES Monuments Act, and various measures to preserve the traditional nature and marine environment. The IVM report submitted by Greenpeace also concludes that there is currently no real impact on ‘ tangible cultural heritage ’ and that ‘ impact of climate change on [intangible cultural heritage, added by the court] is uncertain and difficult to predict ’. 11.19.8. According to the State, it is inappropriate to compare the climate (adaptation) measures taken on Bonaire with those taken in the European Netherlands. The European Netherlands has a longer history of flood control measures because a significant part of the European Netherlands lies below sea level. This is not the case for Bonaire. The Delta Act, the Delta Programme and the Water Act therefore do not apply to Bonaire. Geological differences also mean that climate adaptation on Bonaire requires a completely different approach than climate adaptation in the European Netherlands. The State therefore endorses the key risks identified by the IPCC for small islands and is taking adaptation measures to mitigate these risks, including ensuring the preconditions that are important for climate adaptation to succeed: sufficient financial resources, availability of data and knowledge, and community involvement in adaptation. 11.19.9. With regard to scientific research into climate change on Bonaire, the State notes that data collection within the Netherlands Antilles was inadequate. This continues to have an impact on the availability of data on Bonaire. The State is working hard to improve this situation; since 2016, the KNMI has been conducting research into weather and climate on the BES islands. Although the research conducted by the KNMI since then shows that Bonaire is already experiencing the effects of climate change and will experience even more in the future, the State emphasises that the speed and extent to which these effects will occur on Bonaire are uncertain. This information is relevant in order to assess which adaptation measures are needed and when. The State is therefore funding several studies, including those by HKV (Risk profiles for flooding on the BES Islands) and by Witteveen+Bos (Climate change and adaptation efforts BES islands). 11.19.10. Finally, the State points out that it has a wide margin of appreciation when choosing adaptation measures. ii. Legal framework for adaptation 11.20. Since 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has req Although the UN Climate Convention and the further UN agreements based on it do not yet apply directly to the BES islands (despite the government’s intention, expressed in 2016, to arrange for this to happen ), but as an Annex I country, the State has repeatedly and explicitly committed itself since 1992 to assisting small islands and other vulnerable areas in protecting themselves against the negative effects of climate change. This too influences the content of the duty of care that the State has towards its own citizens living on small islands. 11.24.2. Although parties differ in their views on the extent to which this is the case, it is clear that the inhabitants of Bonaire have been experiencing the negative effects of climate change for many years and to an increasing degree (see 4.14-4.31). Furthermore, it is not disputed that by 2050, a significant part of the low-lying areas of Bonaire will most likely be inundated and that a large part of the buildings and Bonairean cultural heritage are located in precisely those parts of the island. During COP28, the State, also on behalf of the Caribbean Netherlands, drew attention to the particular vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Nevertheless, there is still no climate adaptation plan in place for Bonaire, nor is there an integrated climate adaptation policy. 11.24.3. A project group has been set up to develop a climate adaptation plan (the Bonaire Climate Table project group), but the outcome of this project group will not be a climate adaptation plan. The Climate Table’s task is to identify the views and interests in the field of climate mitigation and adaptation and, based on these, to propose measures to the Executive Council of the OLB. The project group’s proposals must then be laid down in the Bonaire Climate Intention and further specified in the Climate Plan. This is a meaningful process in which the obligation referred to in 10.24.6 to offer opportunities for participation of citizens who may be affected by the proposed measures (or the lack thereof) can be fulfilled. However, it is still unclear how long it will take before a concrete climate adaptation plan is in place. 11.24.4. The fact that nothing concrete can yet be said about the timeline is difficult to reconcile with the urgency of implementing a coherent and comprehensive adaptation policy for Bonaire. Since the early 1990s, it has been clear that the inhabitants of small islands worldwide are at above-average risk of experiencing serious negative consequences of climate change in the relatively short term. For more than a decade, it has been clear that climate change no longer only poses future risks for small islands in the Caribbean, but that their inhabitants are already suffering actual damage to their health, material damage and immaterial damage as a result of climate change (see paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of this judgment). It was also clear well before 10-10-10 – and in any case since the Round Table Conference and the 2005 Outline Agreement – that Caribbean government institutions did not have sufficient knowledge and resources to tackle complex and far-reaching problems such as climate change. 11.24.5. Nevertheless, it took until the Nijpels advisory report in 2023 (‘It is never too late’) for the State to take concrete steps towards a coherent and integrated climate policy for the Caribbean Netherlands. Although the steps now being taken appear appropriate to the court, it cannot be said that they were taken in a timely manner. This assessment takes into account the fact that the European Netherlands has been working on a climate adaptation plan and an integrated adaptation policy since around 2006. Since 2016, the European Netherlands has had a National Adaptation Strategy, which has been implemented and is continuously monitored and refined. This shows that the State has been aware of its obligations regarding climate adaptation for almost two decades, but that it has not pa promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, subregional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws and regulations, and within their respective capacities: i. the development and implementation of educational and public awareness programmes on climate change and its effects; ii. public access to information on climate change and its effects; iii. public participation in addressing climate change and its effects and developing adequate responses; and iv. training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel; (…) 11.32. Greenpeace argues that the State is not fulfilling any of these obligations, or at least not to a sufficient extent. The State believes that it is fulfilling these obligations; it refers in particular to the KNMI climate scenarios, the Climate Impact Atlas for the BES Islands, the efforts made within the framework of (or since) the Climate Table and the efforts mentioned in the letter to House of Representatives of 7 November 2023. i. Assessment of procedural safeguards 11.33. The court finds that virtually all of the efforts mentioned by the State were initiated after 2022. With regard to the period up to 2023, it cannot therefore be said that the State has adequately fulfilled the obligations referred to in 11.30. 11.34. For the period from 2023 onwards, the documents show that the State is catching up, with many necessary overdue measures still being taken and room being made for participation by and knowledge of residents and local organisations. 11.35. However, for the period from 2023 onwards, the lack of binding national standards and concrete policy instruments (see 11.13.3 and 11.24.3) will make it more difficult for citizens to participate in combating climate change and its consequences, and to help devise and implement appropriate measures. In addition, the lack of a clear standards and policy framework for adaptation makes it more difficult for citizens and civil society organisations to identify any shortcomings on the part of the government and to hold it accountable. ii. Interim conclusion on procedural safeguards 11.36. In the period up to 2023, the State did not fulfil its obligations towards the inhabitants of Bonaire as referred to in 11.30 under a and b. With the projects launched since 2023, the State appears to be well on its way to fulfilling the obligations referred to under b. Unequal treatment i. Arguments of the parties 11.37. Greenpeace’s claims are also based on Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 of the Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR (hereinafter: P12). 11.38. According to the State, the situation on Bonaire is different from that in the European Netherlands in terms of climate adaptation. Because the situations are not comparable when it comes to climate adaptation, the State argues that Bonaire and the European Netherlands do not need to be treated equally in that context. 11.38.1. The State acknowledges that the approach in the European Netherlands is different from that in the Caribbean Netherlands, but points to the geographical, climatic and geological differences between the two parts of the Kingdom. The State also points to the fact that Bonaire has only been part of the Netherlands since 2010. Because of these differences, a different climate (adaptation) approach is needed on Bonaire than in the European Netherlands. 11.38.2. The differences in approach are not based on the personal characteristics of the inhabitants. Bonaire and its inhabitants are protected against the adverse effects of climate change on the same basis as the inhabitants of the European Netherlands. Both groups are warned in the event of heat waves, both parts of the Netherlands have a legal and administrative framework for adaptation measures in the context of spatial development, and the nature and environmental policy objectives set for the Caribbean Netherlands are comparable to those for the European Netherlands. Therefore, according to the State, there is no viol In the opinion of the court, the reasons put forward by the State do not justify the conclusion that the different treatment of Bonaire and its inhabitants in terms of (the speed of) climate adaptation measures is appropriate, necessary and proportionate. The circumstances on Bonaire and in the Netherlands are different in the sense that Bonaire is at greater risk from climate change more quickly than the European Netherlands and that the inhabitants of Bonaire have already been suffering actual damage from the negative effects of climate change for some time, while it has also been known for a long time that the local authorities lack the resources and executive power to adequately protect the inhabitants from the negative effects of climate change. The differences that have emerged in these proceedings therefore indicate an even greater urgency in drawing up and implementing a coherent and integrated climate adaptation policy for Bonaire than existed for the European Netherlands. Why a coherent and integrated climate adaptation policy was already implemented in the European Netherlands in 2016, but now a decade later there is still no climate adaptation plan available for the island of Bonaire, and it is also unclear when this will be available, therefore requires further explanation. However, the arguments presented by the State to the court do not constitute adequate justification for the (acknowledged) difference in treatment (see also legal ground 11.23 to 11.27), so that it has not been proven that the difference in treatment serves a legitimate purpose and that the difference in (speed of) adaptation measures is reasonable and proportional. iv. Interim conclusion: violation of Articles 14 and 1 P12 11.47. In view of the above, the court finds that there has been a violation of Article 1 P12 and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR. h. Conclusion: violation of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR and Article 1 P12 11.48. In particular, in view of the considerations set out above in legal grounds 11.12 to 11.17; 11.24 to 11.28; 11.36 to 11.46, the court finds that, overall , the State has failed to fulfil its positive obligations under Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 P12 towards the inhabitants of Bonaire. i. Unlawful act 11.49. The aforementioned violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 P12 also constitutes a violation of the law as referred to in Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code, which can be attributed to the State. j. Allowability of claimed declaratory decisions 11.50. It follows from the considerations set out above in this chapter that, on the basis of Article 8 of the ECHR, the State has a legal obligation to protect the right of Bonaire’s inhabitants to life, health, well-being and the enjoyment of their own culture against the negative effects of climate change. It also follows that the State has failed to adequately fulfil this legal obligation, in violation of the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 1 P12. To that extent, the declaratory decisions sought by Greenpeace are allowable; in all other respects, they are dismissed. Allowability of claimed orders i. No exception to Article 3:296 Dutch Civil Code 11.51. The court has found that, on the basis of Article 8 of the ECHR, the State has a legal obligation to protect the right to life, health, well-being and the right to experience their own culture of the inhabitants of Bonaire against the negative consequences of climate change. In order to fulfil this obligation, the State can be ordered by the court to do so on the basis of Article 3:296 of the Dutch Civil Code, unless there are grounds for an exception. 11.52. Under Article 3:296 of the Dutch Civil Code, an exception applies if the law so provides or if this follows from the nature of the obligation or the legal act. The case law of the Supreme Court on orders to legislate is an application of this exception. 11.53. The Supreme The court dismisses the orders sought by Greenpeace in sections IV and V, because they amount to orders to enact legislation with a specific content on points on which the State has discretionary power (see legal grounds 11.13.4 and 11.15.1). 11.56. The court dismissed the claim for an order, under II.a, for the State, to base all its adaptation policy on Bonaire on, and test it against, the applicable international human rights treaties ratified by the Netherlands, and providing clear reasons for doing so, on the grounds of lack of interest. The order claimed amounts to a confirmation of a rule that already applies without a court order – in general, i.e. not only in the legal relationship between the State and the inhabitants of Bonaire. In other words, there is no question of a declaration regarding the legal relationship between the claimant and the defendant within the meaning of Article 3:302 of the Dutch Civil Code, nor is there a sufficiently concrete interest within the meaning of Article 3:303 of the Dutch Civil Code. 11.57. The court partially allows the orders claimed under II.b and II.c for the State to adopt an adequate adaptation plan for Bonaire as soon as reasonably possible and no later than 1 April 2027 and to ensure that it is implemented. Although the State does not dispute that an adaptation plan for Bonaire must be drawn up as soon as possible, and although the intention to draw up this plan has existed since 2022, it is still unclear when it will be ready. In view of this, Greenpeace has a sufficient interest in an order. The court will order the State to ensure that the targets set out in the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience for the drafting and implementation of a national adaptation plan that also covers Bonaire are achieved on time, i.e. by 2030 (see 11.22.3). It is still too early for a more far-reaching order to the State to ensure that the adaptation plan is also implemented in a timely manner; at this stage, it is not even clear what the plan will entail exactly. 11.58. The order claimed under VI. to establish a national carbon budget within six months cannot be allowed for the reasons stated in 11.15.1 and 11.15.2. The court will grant the alternative claim by ordering the State to provide insight into the (remaining) emission allowance for the Netherlands on which the State bases its decision-making and implementation of climate measures. The State is free to choose how it wishes to comply with this order, on the understanding that the method chosen must comply with the rules on transparent information provision included in the UN Climate Convention and the more detailed UN agreements based on it (see 5.16.6 and 5.16.7). The court considers the claimed period of six months after this judgment to be reasonable, as the underlying information is already available according to the State. The State believes that this information already provides sufficient insight into the (remaining) emission allowance on which the current policy is based, but the court does not agree with the State. l. Provisional enforceability 11.59. The State requests the court to declare that the claims II.a, II.b, II.c, IV, V and VIII are not provisionally enforceable. The State argues that allowing these claims would have far-reaching consequences in that the ministers concerned would then have to take additional decisions as soon as possible and enact legislation and regulations aimed at satisfying these claims. 11.60. The claims under IV and V are dismissed. 11.61. In view of the urgency of the climate problem as recognised by the UN and the EU, Greenpeace has a sufficient interest in its claim to declare the order provisionally enforceable. Because the State has put forward a reasoned defence against this, the court must weigh Greenpeace’s interest in being able to enforce the judgment, even if an appeal is lodged, against the interest of the State in maintaining the status quo until the appea World Oceans and Coastal Zones in: Climate Change: the IPCC Impacts Assessments , Contribution of Working Group II to the First Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AR1), p. 6-5: “ The higher base for storm surges would be particularly important in areas where hurricanes or severe storms are frequent, such as the southeastern US, the Indian subcontinent, the western Pacific and islands in the Caribbean Sea. ” and p. 6-4: Table 6.1 Survey of 1 m sea-level rise and protection costs. (Countries and territories ranked by estimated costs as per cent of GNP*). IPCC, Chapter 9. Coastal Zones and Small Islands, in: Climate change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-Technical analyses, Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AR2); IPCC, Chapter 17. Small Island States, in: Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability , Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report (AR3); IPCC, Chapter 16. Small Islands, in: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability , Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4); IPCC, Chapter 29. Small Islands, in: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability , Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), Advisory Opinion AO-32/25 of 29 May 2025 (hereafter: Advisory Opinon IACHR), under B.3.2, with further references; Resolution 47/24 of the Human Rights Council of 14 July 2021, Human rights and climate change , p. 3; Response from of Minister Jetten (Climate and Energy), also on behalf of the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management and the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations (received 3 June 2022), Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2021/22, no. 2975, p. 1 and Letter from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Foreign Trade and Thevelopment Cooperation of 15 July 2022, BZDOC-1464875700-38, on the efforts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly, p. 4-5. UN News, The Caribbean is ‘Ground Zero’ for the global climate emergency: Guterres , 3 July 2022. IPCC, Chapter 15. Small Islands, in: IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability , Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (hereafter: IPCC AR6 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability). IPCC, Chapter 8. Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable Thevelopment, §2.2, in: IPCC AR6 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. KNMI, Klimaatverandering op de Caribische eilanden ( Climate change in the Caribbean islands ), 1 September 2017. Wageningen University & Research , Staat van de Natuur van Caribisch Nederland 2017: Een eerste beoordeling van de staat (van instandhouding), bedreigingen and managementimplicaties van habitats and soorten in Caribisch Nederland ( State of Nature of the Caribbean Netherlands 2017: An initial assessment of the status (of conservation), threats and management implications of habitats and species in the Caribbean Netherlands ), Research report C086/17, §4.4 Klimaat and klimaatverandering (Climate and climate change), p. 193. KNMI, KNMI’23-klimaatscenario’s voor Nederland ( KNMI’23-climate scenarios for the Netherlands ) The Bilt: KNMI, KNMI-Publication 23-03, p. 37 (hereafter: KNMI 2023). D. Le Bars, Past and future sea level around the BES islands (Technical report; TR-397), The Bilt: KNMI 2022. KNMI 2023, p. 39. KNMI 2023. IVM Institute for Environmental Studies, An Assessment of the Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Inundation on Bonaire An Assessment of the Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Inundation on Bonaire , Report R-22/05, 28 September 2022 (hereafter: IVM 2022/5). Reply, para. 7.9. IVM 2022/5, p. 24-26. HKV Lijn in Water, Risicoprofielen overstromingen BES eilanden ( Flood risk pro An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty , Working Group I Technical Support Unit, October 2018 (hereafter: IPCC, Global Warming of 1,5°C); Thecision 1/CMA.3 Glasgow Climate Pact (COP26)(hereafter: Glasgow Climate Pact) in: UN-document FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1 (unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf); Thecision 1/CP.27 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (COP27)(hereafter: Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan) in: UN-document FCCC/CP/2022/10/Add.1 (unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2022_10a01_E.pdf#page=2); IPCC AR6 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report, §A.1-A.2; UN General Assembly Resolution The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment , A/RES/76/300, 28 July 2022 (hereafter: UN Resolution 76/300); ECtHR (GC) 9 April 2024, no. 53600/20, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0409JUD005360020 (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen/Switzerland ) (hereafter: the KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment), §103-120 with more references. See also the Urgenda -judgment, para. 4.1-4.8. IPCC, 2023: Summary for Policymakers, in: IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report. Glasgow Climate Pact; Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, in particular under 3 and V.14-19; ICJ, Obligations of States in respect of climate change , Advisory Opinion 2025/187, 23 July 2025 (hereafter: Advisory Opinion ICJ), §242-245; more about all three in chapter 5 of this judgment. World Meteorological Organization, State of the Global Climate 2022 , WMO-No. 1316, p. 3. Cf. the High Ambition Coalition Ministerial Statement on the Global Stocktake of 31 October 2023, which was also signed by the Netherlands. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change with annexes, New York, 9 May 1992, Trb . 1992/189. Article 2 UNFCCC. Article 3 lid 1 and 4 lid 2 under a UNFCCC; see also the 18th para. of the Preamble to the UNFCCC. Article 3(3) UNFCCC. Article 4(1)(e) UNFCCC. Article 4(4) UNFCCC. Article 4(1)(f) and (g) UNFCCC. Article 3(3) UNFCCC. Article 7 UNFCCC. Article 4 and 12 UNFCCC. Article 6 UNFCCC. Trb . 1998/170. Kyoto Protocol bij the VN-Klimaatverdrag (met Bijlagen), Kyoto, 11 Thecember 1997, Trb. 1999, 110. ‘ Slow onset events ’ are according to the definition of the IPCC (unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/soe_synopsis.pdf) inter alia sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification. unfccc.int/tools/cancun/adaptation/index.html; unfccc.int/process/conferences/the-big-picture/milestones/the-cancun-agreements. Trb . 2016/94; Trb . 2017/141. Article 2(1) Paris Agreement. Article 4 Paris Agreement. Article 3 Paris Agreement. Article 4(4) Paris Agreement. Article 4(2) and (9) and Article 14(3) Paris Agreement. Article 4(3) Paris Agreement. Article 4(8), (9) and (19) Paris Agreement; Thecision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement (COP21)(hereafter: Thecision 1/CP.21) , in: UN-document FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Article 4(4) Paris Agreement. Article 4(8), (13) and (14) Paris Agreement and Thecision 1/CP.21. Article 4(7) Paris Agreement. Article 4(9) Paris Agreement. Article 13(7) Paris Agreement. Thecision 1/CP.21. Article 7(2), (6) and (7) Paris Agreement. Article 7(5) Paris Agreement. Article 4(16-18) Paris Agreement. Cf. article 12(8) UNFCCC, the Preamble (in particular under 27, 30 and 36) and article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999. Glasgow Climate Pact. Cf. Resolution 47/24 of the Human Rights Council of 26 July 2021, Human rights and climate change . See also Thecision 2/CMA.5 Global goal on adaptation (hereafter: Thecision 2/CMA.5), in: UN-document FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1, §15 under a, (p. 5): “15. Notes with alarm and serious concern the following fin 2015, 228. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34589 (R2077), no. 3 (Explanatory memorandum; explanatory memorandum), p. 8. Ministry of Climate and Green Growth, Klimaatplan 2025-2035, Op weg naar een klimaatneutraal Nederland ( Climate Plan 2025-2035, Towards a climate-neutral Netherlands ), March 2025, Publication-no. 25400800. PBL, Klimaat- en Energieverkenning 2025 ( Climate and Energy Exploration ), The Hague 2025, PBL-publication-no.: 5692, p. 6. Advisory Thepartment of the Council of State, Advice no. W19.25.00208/IV , 10 September 2025 about the Climate- and Energy memorandum 2025, p. 8. Ministry of van Economic Affairs and Climate, Eighth Netherland National Communication Under The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change , p. 183-185. Netherlands Court of Audit, Aanpassing aan klimaatverandering: strategie and beleid ( Adapting to climate change: strategy and policy ), Report 5 November 2012. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 31568, no. 125 (Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs). Act of 23 March 2016 containing rules regarding the production and distribution of electricity and drinking water on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Electricity and Drinking Water Act BES, Stb . 2016, 142). Annex 1101814 (Electricity and drinking water supplies on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba: reliable, sustainable and affordable?, An evaluation of the BES Electricity and Drinking Water Act) to Kamerstukken II 2022/23, 34089, no. 19 (Letter from the Minister for Climate and Energy). Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 31710, no. 44 (Letter from the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment). The decision memo (open.overheid.nl/documenten/16625d8f-6ba2-4905-8f22-29648b2d81d0/file) states about that: “ No additional resources are available for the implementation of the NMBP in the coming years. Achieving the established goals and commitment depends on a claim for resources yet to be developed. ”, p. 2. Kamerstukken II 2022/23, 33576, no. 355 (Letter from the Minister for Nature and Nitrogen), p. 2. Kamerstukken II 2022/2023, 27625, no. 590 (Letter from the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management), p. 17. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ruimtelijk ontwikkelingsprogramma Caribisch Netherland ( Spatial Thevelopment Programme Caribbean Netherlands ), July 2024, §3.4 Protecting crucial and sensitive functions from the consequences of climate change, July 2024, p. 17. Inspectorate for the Environment and Transport, Vergunningverlening, toezicht and handhaving (VTH) door the Openbaar Lichaam Bonaire ( Licensing, Supervision and Enforcement (VTH) by the Public Entity Bonaire ), 1 June 2023. HKV 2016 and HKV 2024. Wageningen University & Research (WUR), Staat van de natuur van Caribisch Nederland 2017 ( State of the nature for the Caribbean Netherlands 2017 ), and Staat van de natuur van Caribisch Nederland 2024 ( State of the nature for the Caribbean Netherlands 2024 ) and A Nature Inclusive Vision for Bonaire in 2050 , 2020. Witteveen+Bos, Climate change and adaptation efforts BES islands , Final report, 21 October 2024 (hereafter: Witteveen+Bos 2024); KNMI, The staat van ons klimaat 2024 ( The state of our climate 2024 ), The Bilt: KNMI, KNMI-Publication 25-012024. Administrative agreement between Bonaire and the Kingdom 2024-2027 , p. 10 (the State exhibit 19). Bonaire Cultural Agenda, priorities 2024-2028 , p. 8 and 9. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands , p. 15, §3. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 11, endnote 11: p. 42. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 15, endnote 39: p. 43. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, box text on p. 18, endnote 64: p. 43. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 29 and 30, highlight ‘Priorities 2023-2029:’, priority G. Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, Aanpassen met ambitie Nationale klimaatadaptatie strategie 2016 (NAS) ( Adapting with ambition National Climate Adaptation Strategy 2016 (NAS) Commission for the evaluation of the implementation of the new constitutional structure of the Caribbean Netherlands (“Spies Commission”), Vijf jaar verbonden: Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, Saba en Europees Nederland (Five years of association: Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, Saba and the European Netherlands), 12 October 2015, The Hague, p. 10, 27 and 99. Kamerstukken II , 2019/20, 35300-IV, no. 11 (Information from the Advisory Division of the Council of State on the existing structure between the Caribbean and European Netherlands and the coordinating role of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), p. 42, under D, first bullet. Kamerstukken II , 2019/20, 35300-IV, no. 11 (Letter from the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations). Kamerstukken II, 2022/23, 36200-IV, no. 85 (Letter from the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations). See e.g. Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, p. 35. Statement of defense, pars. 6.30 and 6.31. Writ of summons, para. 36.4: by ‘Article 14 ECHR’ Greenpeace means the prohibition of discrimination in all legal and factual actions of the government pursuant to Article 14 ECHR and Article 1 P12. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §412: “Judicial intervention, including by this Court, cannot replace or provide any substitute for the action which must be taken by the legislative and executive branches of government. However, democracy cannot be reduced to the will of the majority of the electorate and elected representatives, in disregard of the requirements of the rule of law. The remit of domestic courts and the Court is therefore complementary to those democratic processes. The task of the judiciary is to ensure the necessary oversight of compliance with legal requirements.” The Urgenda -judgment , para.5.7.6 and 5.7.7. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §442: “It follows, therefore, that each State has its own share of responsibilities to take measures to tackle climate change and that the taking of those measures is determined by the State’s own capabilities rather than by any specific action (or omission) of any other State (see Duarte Agostinho and Others , cited above, §§ 202-03). The Court considers that a respondent State should not evade its responsibility by pointing to the responsibility of other States, whether Contracting Parties to the Convention or not.” The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §538. ECtHR 18 November 2025, no. 40054/23, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:1118DEC004005423 ( Fliegenschnee/Austria )(hereafter: the Fliegenschnee -judgment), §26. ECtHR, Guide on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights , version of 28 February 2025 (hereafter: Guide on Article 2) (ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_2_eng) §21; ECtHR, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights , version of 28 February 2025 (hereafter: Guide on Article 8), ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_8_eng, §192. The Fliegenschnee -judgment, §27-29. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §538; Guide on Article 2, §11; Guide on Article 8, §9-16 and §192. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §410-520 and §538 under (a). The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §413-421. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §431-434. The Urgenda -judgment, para. 4.1-4.8 with further references. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §410-422; IPCC AR6 The Physical Science Basis IPCC. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §413, §431-434 and §456. The 1992 UNFCCC; the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Trb . 2005, 1; IPCC, Global Warming of 1,5°C ; Glasgow Climate Pact; Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan; Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 establishing a framework for the achievement of climate neutrality; IPCC, IPCC AR6 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability; IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report, §A.1-A.2; UN Resolution 76/300; Advisory Opinion ICJ, Chapter II; United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2024: No more hot air … please! , Executive summary, p. XII et seq. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judg the KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §446, §546 and §551; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §430; the Urgenda -judgment, para. 7.2.11. See chapter 5. Cf. Advisory Opinion ICJ, Chapter IV.B.5, in particular §224, §230, §243 and §245. Article 4(1) Paris Agreement. Article IV.21 Glasgow Climate Pact; Article I.7 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. Article IV.22 Glasgow Climate Pact. Article IV.14 Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. Article 4(9) Paris Agreement. Article 3(1) and 4(2) under a UNFCCC; Article 4(4) Paris Agreement; Dictum Advisory Opinion ICJ, §547 under A.b. Article 4(9) and article 14(3) Paris Agreement; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §243. Article 4(1)(a) and Article 12(1)(a) UNFCCC; Article 13(7) Paris Agreement. Article 4(1)(b) and Article 12(1)(b) UNFCCC; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §201-203. Article 4 and article 12 UNFCCC; article 7 Kyoto Protocol; article 4(2) Paris Agreement; Glasgow Climate Pact, IV.28-30. Articles 4 and 12 UNFCCC; articles 3(4) and 7 Kyoto Protocol; Decision 24/CP.19 Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in: UN-document FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.3 (hereafter: Decision 24/CP.19)(unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a03.pdf#page=2), p. 2-3; Article 3(a) of Decision 15/CMP.1 Guidelines for the preparation of the information required under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol in: UN-document FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (hereafter: Decision 15/CMP.1) (unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=54). Article 5(1) Kyoto Protocol. Cf. Advisory Opinion ICJ, §202-207 and §236. Articles 13 and 14 Paris Agreement; Decision 24/CP.19, p. 4-22 (Annex 1); Decision 15/CMP.1. Cf. the KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §570-573; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §289. Advisory Opinion ICJ, §208 and 229. Cf. Kamerstukken II 2021/22, 36169, no. 3 (Explanatory memorandum), p. 6. Article 2(2) Climate law; Kamerstukken II 2021/22, 36169, no. 4 (Advice from the Advisory Division of the Council of State and further report), p. 3-4. Cf. the advice of the Council of State on the bill to amend the Climate Act: Kamerstukken II 2021/22, 36169, no. 4 (Advice from the Advisory Division of the Council of State and further report). The Dutch legislator was aware of this: Kamerstukken II 2021/22, 36169, no. 3 (Explanatory memorandum), p. 6-7. By the way, the EU's NDC of 16 October 2023, The update of the nationally determined contribution of the European Union and its Member States (hereafter: NDC van the EU 2023) states the following objective on p. 15 (court emphasis): “Regulation (EU) 2023/857 sets an EU-level greenhouse gas emission reduction target of 40% by 2030, compared to 2005 , for the sectors that it covers . Each EU Member State will reduce its emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 in accordance with the following percentage: (…) Netherlands 48% (…)” . See, for example, the overview of the areas of application, objectives and reference years for the various instruments submitted by the State as exhibit 63. europarl.europa.eu/topics/nl/article/20191129STO67756/uitstoot-van-vliegtuigen-en-schepen-feiten-en-cijfers-infografiek; rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/luchtvaart/co2-uitstoot-luchtvaart. Pleading notes of de State (mitigatie; mitigation), p. 38 (not included in interim targets; partly included by meeting European standards); cbs.nl/nl-nl/dossier/dossier-broeikasgassen/hoe-groot-is-onze-broeikasgasuitstoot-wat-is-het-doel-; clo.nl/indicatoren/nl052127-emissies-door-de-zeescheepvaart-1990-2022. EU NDC 2023, p. 4 and p. 12 under b. Articles 4 and 12 UNFCCC; article 4 Paris Agreement; Decision 1/CP.21; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §244. Article 6 UNFCCC; The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §554. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §551, with reference to §543; cf. the established case law referred to in §428. The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §543; cf. the established case law referred to in in §538. Cf. the KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §538 under (d); Advisory Opinion ICJ, §226-229; Advisory Opinion IACHR In recent years (secondly), we have primarily experienced a lack of implementation and administrative capacity of the islands’ public bodies, which is therefore partly responsible for the malfunctioning of the systems. ” (sheet 2), and “ The climate scenarios -necessary for adequate stress testing are less detailed for the Caribbean Netherlands than for EUR NL, meaning the islands are insufficiently able to identify, design, and implement the most effective measures. In virtually all environmental policy areas, the minimum desired progress is lacking. ” (sheet 4), and “ For IandW, the work surrounding the BES islands often involves tasks that do not fit within the current organizational structure. Firstly, because the tasks are often delegated, and secondly, because the state of infrastructure on the islands lags behind or deviates significantly from what is currently available in EurNL. ” (sheet 5), and “ Climate adaptation. In the Netherlands, municipalities have their own responsibility for climate adaptation. However, the islands lack the expertise to deal with this issue, resulting in insufficient insight into climate risks and insufficient or no measures being taken to mitigate these risks. IandW could consider providing the necessary technical assistance. To prevent a report from being compiled that disappears into a drawer, we recommend imposing a co-financing requirement. ” (sheet 7). From the Memorandum for information dated 12 April 2019 ( Climate adaptation BES islands, St Maarten, Aruba and Curaçao , Greenpeace exhibit 43) submitted with the summons and the internal memo from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management early January 2022 ( Elaboration of the coalition agreement for drinking water, wastewater and marine environment in the Caribbean Netherlands , Greenpeace exhibit 49) it follows that at that time it was known within IandW that there was no adaptation policy for the Caribbean Netherlands, that it was urgently needed, but that there were no concrete plans or budgets to create it. See 6.17 of this judgment and footnote 110. This is also called ‘system responsibility’ or ‘system responsibility’; see, for example, the PowerPoint presentation “IandW’s efforts in the Caribbean Netherlands for the next cabinet period” of 14 April 2022 (Greenpeace exhibit 54), sheet 3 entitled “System Responsibility” (“The fact is that the state of the vital infrastructure and the environmental policy are structurally not in order and the minister can decide to intervene because he is standing for the IandW objectives of safety, accessibility and livability” ). The KlimaSeniorinnen -judgment, §553-554; article 6 UNFCCC; Advisory Opinion ICJ, §280. See also Compliance Committee Aarhus Convention 1 July 2020, Recommendations with regard to request for advice ACCC/A12020/2 by Kazakhstan , ECE//MP.PP/C.1/2021/6, under A. Statement of defense, pars. 8.116-8.145 and 15.25-15.31; statement of rejoinder, para. 8.31. Statement of rejoinder, pars. 3.49-3.53 and 8.31. Kamerstukken II 2023/24, 32813, no. 1312 (Letter from the State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations), §1. Statement of defense, pars. 8.127-8.145; statement of rejoinder, pars. 3.49-3.53 and 8.31. Guide on Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination) and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination), ks.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr-ks/guide_art_14_art_1_protocol_12_eng, versie 28 februari 2025 (hierna: Guide on Article 14), §3. Guide on Article 14, §20-24. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms , (hereafter: Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 12), §33; ECtHR 20 December 2022, no. 53282/18 and 31428/20, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:1220JUD005328218 ( Moraru and Marin/Romania ), §99-100. Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 12, §22. ECRM (Plenary) 28 October 1987, no. 8695/79, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1987:1028JUD000869579 ( Inze/Au