Rechtspraak Gerechtshof Amsterdam 2018-10-23

ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:3864

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With every new discovery of other contractual breaches an additional notice of termination can be sent. Mr [H] agrees that on the basis of the facts known to the Meeting, which have also been taken into account by the Enterprise Chamber when suspending RIAMO for an indefinite time with no right to any form of compensation, one must conclude that Mr [appellant sub 2] and RIAMO seriously breached their duties and obligations towards Novero GmbH and [Rotendo]. Mr [H] understands that the German lawyers have therefore advised that Novero GmbH can terminate and dissolve this contract without further liabilities for [Rotendo]. The Meeting unanimously approves, in accordance with points 7 and 7bis of the Agenda, • the decision to terminate the employment agreement between Novero GmbH and Mr [appellant sub 2] and the decision to terminate any other employment agreement, service agreement, management agreement or similar, as may appear to be in existence, between [ Riamo ] and any one or more of the entities belonging to the Novero Group of companies,· (…) Point 6 and 6 bis of the agenda: Approval of decision to terminate Management Agreement with RIAMO and to initiate legal proceedings against RIAMO Mr [H] asks whether Mr. [G ] considers that the known facts (as established at the shareholders’ meeting of 12 June 2013 and at the hearing of the Enterprise Chamber on 20 June 2013) are sufficient grounds to argue breach of contract and/or ‘urgent reasons’ (dringende redenen) in order to terminate the agreements without Iiability for [Rotendo]. Mr [G ] replies that, indeed, many of these facts can qualify as such reasons and that the decision of the Enterprise Chamber says so much about the position of RIAMO , that already on that account one can speak of material and serious breach of primary duties of a director. As far as point 6bis is concerned, Mr. [G ] is in a process of discussing and analysing this further, in order to see what other claims [Rotendo] may have against RIAMO , taking also into account the new information that is becoming available from the investigations of the accounts, such as the apparent existence of an unknown contract between RIAMO and the Novero GmbH. The Meeting unanimously approves, in accordance with point 6 and 6bis of the Agenda, • the decision to terminate the Management Agreement with [ Riamo ] and to dismiss [ Riamo ] as Director (suspended) of [Rotendo]; ( ... ). Deze besluiten zijn tijdens de aandeelhoudersvergadering van 8 augustus 2013 bekrachtigd omdat tijdens de vergadering van 5 juli 2013 niet was voldaan aan het quorumvereiste van artikel 15 lid 10 van de statuten van Rotendo (hierna: het ontslagbesluit). voorts in zaak 200.217.638/01 2.21. Bij brief van 24 september 2013 heeft [H] aan Riamo en Arch bericht, voor zover van belang: 11. In view of my own observations and the information provided by the Board, I have no reason to believe that the assessment provided by the Board to the Shareholders’ Meeting in [the] meetings of 12 June, 5 July, 8 August and 5 September 2013 – regarding the financial distress the Group has been suffering since June 2013 and continues suffering despite Arch's providing already € 8.0 million – is incorrect and is not a genuine reflection of the Group's very urgent financial situation and needs. Neither have I any reason to believe that the current Board should be able to attract bank financing or other external financing on short or middle long term, in view of the information provided by the current Board and in view of the fact that no Board has been able to secure any external financing since the Enterprise Chamber appointed external officials in March 2013. (…) 14. I have come to the conclusion that, under the exceptional circumstances [Rotendo] is in and if no real alternative solution arises before, I must favour a proposal of the Board to sell the assets of [Rotendo] as soon as possible. (…) I wish to make clear already, that I will not object to a sale to Arch, if the Board comes to the conclusion that Arch is the only or the best purchaser, provided that the price is or will be objectively established. 15. In my opinion, it will be in the interest of the enterprise, [Rotendo] and the shareholders, to prepare and perform an orderly sale of [Rotendo’s] assets as soon as possible in a scenario without insolvency. The alternative is that the subsidiaries and [Rotendo] will file for suspension of payments or bankruptcy, as soon as Arch should stop providing further financing, which Arch may do any time. In an insolvency scenario, however, the value of the assets will necessarily be lower and there will be a considerable risk that the subsidiaries will lose part or all of their business and will also become insolvent. This would seriously endanger the continuity of the enterprise itself, affect the job security of more than 300 employees in Germany and Canada and will most likely irreparably destroy completely [Rotendo’s] already heavily suffering reputation among its customers in the automotive industry. 16. The objections put forward by Riamo do not, in my opinion, outweigh the urgent necessity of [Rotendo] to sell the assets/enterprise to an entity that will be able to ascertain the short, middle and long term financing the enterprise desperately needs, regardless whether such entity is Arch or any other third party willing to pay the best price under the circumstances. (…) Both the Board and the Shareholders’ Meeting should obviously see to it, that the price will be a fair one under the circumstances. 2.22. Op 12 oktober 2013 heeft [B] onder meer het volgende aan de aandeelhouders van Rotendo gerapporteerd: The Board observes that (parts of) the enterprise has (have) reasonable prospects in the medium and long term to become profitable, but that such profitability can only be achieved with substantial upfront financing in a financially stable environment. [Rotendo] can offer neither. The consequence is that if the enterprise remains attached to [Rotendo], the Group will necessarily decrease in value and on short term become insolvent. Furthermore, the Group can only continue its operations as long as its only current financier is willing to continue its precarious financing. As soon as this only financier should declare to the Board and the management of the subsidiaries that it is no longer willing to finance the Group, the Board and management will have no other option than to file for moratorium of payments or bankruptcy or as the case may be.

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In consequence, the Board sees no other option than selling its main assets, both in the interest of [Rotendo] as well as in the interest of the subsidiaries. Under these circumstances, the conclusions can be summarised as follows: - The Group needs a minimum of 4,4 million Euro immediate short term financing (until 1 January 2013) in order to avoid insolvency, - The Group needs an additional 14,6 million Euro immediate middle and long term financing in 2014-15, in order to sustain the value of the enterprise. - [Rotendo] is not able to close the Group's books of 2012 because debts of 2012 that must have been paid in accordance with German legislation have not been settled yet and because there is not sufficient certainty as to the going-concern status of the Group. - The Group is unable to attract external financing: banks will not finance the Group because the Group has been making heavy losses which are continuing, there is uncertainty as to the control over the Group, the Group can offer no security, and because the 2012 books cannot be closed. - [Rotendo] is unable to attract equity: for the same reasons as the banks will not finance and because [Rotendo] cannot offer any control over the business. - The Group is consequently completely dependent on the willingness of one financier/shareholder to continue financing the Group. - The Board sees no reasonable alternative in order to avoid insolvency, other than selling the main assets of [Rotendo]. - The Board considers that selling the main assets will be in the best interest of the enterprise and all its stakeholders, including the shareholders of [Rotendo], as well as the subsidiaries. 2.23. Op 15 oktober 2013 heeft een algemene vergadering van Rotendo plaatsgevonden. Ter gelegenheid van deze vergadering zijn, naast verkoop, ook alternatieven besproken, waaronder een al eerder voorgestelde storting in agio door de beide aandeelhouders, respectievelijk het aanvragen van het faillissement van Rotendo. Tijdens de vergadering is geconstateerd: dat aanvullende financiering gezien de positie van Rotendo en haar werkmaatschappijen op zeer korte termijn onontbeerlijk is, dat het onder de huidige omstandigheden onmogelijk is externe financiering aan te trekken, dat de aandeelhouders van Rotendo niet in staat of bereid zijn de (verdere) benodigde financiering te verschaffen, dat als gevolg van dit een en ander, bij gebreke van enig alternatief, voorlopige surséance zal moeten worden gevraagd of aangifte tot faillietverklaring zal moeten worden gedaan, met als waarschijnlijk gevolg dat ook de dochtermaatschappijen kort daarop failliet zullen worden verklaard en dat dit waarschijnlijk het verlies van ongeveer 400 banen en een omvangrijke kapitaalvernietiging ten gevolge zal hebben. Arch heeft ter vergadering twee opties met verschillende voorwaarden voor verkoop van de aandelen in de dochtermaatschappijen gepresenteerd. Het bestuur heeft ten aanzien van deze twee opties positief gereageerd. [H] heeft aangekondigd dat hij in beginsel op de voorgenomen buitengewone algemene vergadering van 31 oktober 2013 vóór een voorstel tot verkoop zal stemmen, indien dat voorstel zoals nader uit te werken en vast te leggen tussen het bestuur en Arch, is gebaseerd op een van beide opties en wordt aangegaan onder de voorwaarden opgenomen in de bij die optie behorende Term Sheet. Over de verschillende mogelijkheden is toen zoals aangekondigd niet gestemd. Riamo was bij deze vergadering niet vertegenwoordigd. 2.24. In een brief van 16 oktober 2013 aan Riamo heeft [B] namens Rotendo voormelde opties uitgewerkt en daarin onder meer het volgende geschreven: As Riamo has missed the Meeting and it will take time to have the full minutes of the Meeting drafted, the Board wishes to inform and request Riamo as follows. 1. The Board (for this matter represented solely by its court appointed Board member Mr [B] ) issued its Report on a Proposed Sale of the Main Assets of [Rotendo] on 12 October 2013, including Deloitte's valuation (…), in which the Board urged the Shareholders’ Meeting to resolve as soon as possible that [Rotendo] shall sell its assets, for the reasons explained in the Report, which sets out the financial deterioration of the companies. 2. The following days intensive negotiations took place between the Board (for this matter represented solely by Mr [B] ) and Arch ( ... ), in close consultation with the court appointed share trustee (Mr [H] ), about a possible sale of the assets to Arch or to a Company related to Arch. 3. On 15 October 2013, the Board (for this matter represented solely by Mr [B] ) took notice of a proposal presented by Arch of two options with different conditions on which a sale can take place, which Arch presented that same day at the Shareholders’ Meeting of 15 October 2013. The Board (in this represented solely by Mr [B] ) advised the Shareholders’ Meeting positively on these two options. (…) • Option 2: A Dutch company to be designated by Arch will purchase and receive the enterprise (consisting of the Subsidiaries and Receivables (…)) as soon as possible against a purchase price equal to the value established by Deloitte in accordance with Management Case 1, which price will be paid by offsetting provisionally the claims Arch/[DPH]/1080 Investments BV [evenals Arch en DPH een aan [X] gelieerde vennootschap; hierna: 1080, hof] have against [Rotendo] on the basis of loans provided by them, under the conditions that: 1. a request will be made to the Enterprise Chamber by [Rotendo] to appoint an expert valuator, who shall value the enterprise in accordance with parameters to be set by the Enterprise Chamber. The valuation by that expert valuator will cause definitive offsetting of Arch's, [1080’s] and [DPH's] claims against [Rotendo] to the amount of the valuation against the purchase price and, if the valuation should exceed the claims and loans of Arch/[DPH]/[1080] against [Rotendo], additional payments by the purchaser to [Rotendo]; and 2. Arch shall continue financing [Rotendo’s] existing and ongoing operational costs (not being loans and other claims of the shareholders against [Rotendo]) with a maximum of € 1,0 million Euro. 2.25. Op 17 oktober 2013 heeft Riamo bij het Amtsgericht Düsseldorf het faillissement van Rotendo aangevraagd. Bij eindvonnis van 13 mei 2014 is het verzoek afgewezen. 2.26. Bij brief van 26 oktober 2013 heeft [B] aan Riamo bericht, voor zover hier relevant: Thank you for your e-mail of 25 October 2013, in which you inform [Rotendo] (…) that Riamo received two indicative bids from Springwater Capital respectively MM Invest. (…) Although the Board is positively surprised by the indicative bids, the Board observes that the offers are no more than indicative and do not bind Springwater and MM Invest in any manner whatsoever. The Board further notes that the indicative offers have been made on the basis of information that was not provided or checked by the Board. The Board can derive from the assumptions Springwater and MM Invest mention in their letters that the indicative offers are not based on information the Board would probably corroborate as a true and fair picture of [Rotendo]. (…) Further, the letters mention that Springwater and MM Invest will not be in a position to make a binding offer until due diligence investigations have been conducted and it is clear from both letters that a binding offer should not be expected before the end of the year 2013, if not later. Furthermore, both Springwater and MM Invest indicate that their willingness to make bids, if any, will also depend on the willingness of third parties to offer loans.

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(…) Given these facts, the Board must conclude that there is no binding offer now (…) (…) Without an immediate cash injection of € 4.0 million [Rotendo] cannot wait any longer in accepting the 8010 Acquisitions B.V.'s [een door [X] gecontroleerde vennootschap wier naam later is gewijzigd in Novero Investments B.V.; hierna: Novero Investments, hof] binding offer in one of its options, if and as the Enterprise Chamber may allow and indicate. There is no time to await final bi[d]s, if any, resulting from the requested due diligence investigation and negotiations with Springwater or MM Invest. (…) For the sake of clarity, the damage [Rotendo] may suffer and for which a full indemnification will be needed, includes in any event the nominal amount of the loans to the subsidiaries, currently estimated in € 26,5 million, which is the price [Novero Investment] is offering [Rotendo] according to the Term Sheet number 1, as well as any possible damage as a result of a bankruptcy. If Riamo is willing and able to offer said guarantees, please let me know as soon as possible so that we can discuss the details. The guarantees will have to be provided no later than 30 October 2013. 2.27. Op 30 oktober 2013 heeft het bestuur van Novero GmbH het volgende aan Rotendo bericht: The financial situation of both novero GmbH and novero Dabendorf GmbH is such that the two companies will not be able to meet their payment obligations with their own actual and future cash-flows, neither in the very near future nor on the basis of a medium term perspective. They therefore need immediate further financial support from its shareholders. I have been informed that there is a tangible prospect that on very short notice further financing will be made available as a result of a decision of the upcoming Shareholder's Meeting of 31st October 2013. Should as a result of the Shareholders’ Meeting no further prospect of finance by the Shareholders exist, the filing of an application for opening insolvency proceedings would be unavoidable. 2.28. De beschikking van de Ondernemingskamer van 30 oktober 2013 (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:4769) luidt als volgt, voor zover hier van belang: Riamo ’s bestrijding van de door [Rotendo] gegeven gedocumenteerde toelichting op de ook thans nog bestaande omvangrijke financieringsbehoefte is niet toereikend. Arch/1080 is niet bereid om nog verdere bridge loans te verstrekken. Ook Riamo zelf kan of wil niet in (verdere) financiering voorzien. Alternatieven zijn – naar [B] ter terechtzitting heeft verklaard en aan welke verklaring de Ondernemingskamer geen reden heeft te twijfelen – niet voorhanden. Daarbij, zo heeft [B] ter terechtzitting toegelicht, speelt mede een rol, dat het aandeelhoudersconflict in de weg staat aan het aantrekken van externe financiering. Nu – naar tussen partijen niet in geschil is – de onderneming van [Rotendo], althans met name die van haar dochtermaatschappijen, wel (commercieel) perspectief bieden, bestaat de mogelijkheid deze op redelijke voorwaarden, die dat perspectief weerspiegelen, van de hand te doen. Aldus kan volgens [B] worden voorkomen, dat, bij gebreke van verdere financiering, met [Rotendo] ook haar dochtermaatschappen te gronde gaan. In dat licht kan naar het oordeel van de Ondernemingskamer niet worden gezegd, dat het voornemen tot verkoop van de dochtermaatschappijen en het uitwerken en vervolgens uitvoeren van dat voornemen (op voorhand) als (kennelijk) onredelijk kan worden aangemerkt. (…) Bij de beoordeling van de voorgenomen verkoop van de dochtermaatschappijen moet vanzelfsprekend worden bedacht, dat de verkoop op zichzelf geen vermindering van de waarde van de aandelen in [Rotendo] ten gevolge heeft, mits de koopprijs de waarde van die dochtermaatschappijen reflecteert. In dat verband heeft Riamo bezwaren aangevoerd tegen het rapport Deloitte dat een rol speelt bij optie 1. Wat er ook zij van die bezwaren (…) om iedere twijfel weg te nemen, zal de Ondernemingskamer het verzoek van [Rotendo] tot het treffen van onmiddellijke voorzieningen slechts toewijzen voor zover het optie 2 betreft. Als gevolg daarvan kan optie 1 niet tegen de wil van Riamo worden gekozen, terwijl optie 2 voorziet in een waardering door een onafhankelijk deskundige waardoor aan voormelde voorwaarde ten aanzien van de koopprijs is voldaan. Dit betekent, dat de bezwaren van Riamo tegen het rapport Deloitte geen behandeling hoeven. (…)